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  • 21 Aug, 2019

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Battle Of Łódź (1914)
Russian victory

Full results
  • German plan of encirclement and destruction failed
  • Planned Russian invasion of Silesia failed
Belligerents  German Empire
 Austria-Hungary

Russian Empire

Commanders and leaders German Empire Paul von Hindenburg
German Empire Erich Ludendorff
German Empire August von Mackensen
German Empire Karl Litzmann
German Empire Alfred Bizen †
German Empire Winkler von Dankenschweil †
German Empire Otto von Henning † Nikolai Ruzsky
Paul von Rennenkampf
Sergei Sheydeman
Paul von Plehwe
Samad Beg Mehmandarov
Units involved German Empire Ninth Army
German Empire Eighth Army
Austria-Hungary First Army
North-Western Front
Strength 279,000–380,000 infantry and cavalry (entire group), 1,420–1,440 guns, 700 machine guns 367,000 combat troops
1,305–1,311 guns
740 machine gunsCasualties and losses Total: 160,000 including 36,000 KIA 23,000 POWs
23 cannons 110,000–280,000 total casualties

The Battle of Łódź (German: Schlacht um Łódź) or Lodz operation (Russian: Лодзинская операция, romanized: Lodzinskaya operatsia), took place from 11 November to 6 December 1914, near the city of Łódź in Poland. Battles were fought between German units of the Eighth army, Ninth Army, Austrian First Army, and the Russian First, Second, and Fifth Armies, in harsh winter conditions. The Germans redeployed their Ninth Army around Thorn, so as to threaten the Russian northern flank, following German reversals after the Battle of the Vistula River. The German objective was to prevent an invasion of Germany, by encircling and destroying the Russians, as a result, Germans themselves were surrounded and actually lost 2 corps, although the invasion of Germany was prevented Battle had a strong impact on both the Western and Eastern fronts. It ended with the victory of the Russian troops, although the planned invasion of Germany was canceled.

Russian map of the Lodz operation

Background

Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolayevich favored Nikolai Ruzsky's plan to invade Silesia on 14 November, with the Russian Second, Fifth, and Fourth Armies. The Russian Tenth and First Armies maintained pressure on East Prussia, while the Eighth Army pressed against the Carpathian passes, the Eleventh besieged Przemyśl, and the Third army advanced on Kraków. Hindenburg and Ludendorff had moved the German Ninth Army to the Thorn area, in an attempt to defend Silesia. The Ninth Army consisted of the XI, XVII, and XX Corps, plus the 3rd Guards Infantry Division, and the I Reserve and XXV Reserve Corps from the Eighth Army. Four divisions of the Austro-Hungarian Second Army took over the German Ninth Army's former positions, the remainder of Second Army troops then came under the command of the Austro-Hungarian Third army. The Germans had placed 15 infantry divisions, and 5 cavalry divisions, under Mackensen's Ninth Army in its drive on Łódź. However, the German advance faced 24 Russian infantry divisions and 8 cavalry divisions. The Scheidemann's Russian Second army was deployed around Łódź, with his IV, I and XXIII Corps on the Warta, and his II Corps at Łęczyca. Rennenkampf's Russian First Army was deployed further east, along the Vistula.

On 1 November, Paul von Hindenburg was appointed commander of the two German armies on the Eastern Front. His Eighth Army was defending East Prussia. Knowing Silesia would be invaded on 14 November, Hindenburg and Ludendorff decided not to meet the attack head-on, but to seize the initiative by shifting their Ninth Army north by railway to the border south of the German fortress at Thorn, where they were reinforced with two corps transferred from Eighth Army. The enlarged Ninth Army would then attack the Russian right flank, cutting Łódź off from Warsaw, and eliminating any troops thus encircled. In ten days Ninth Army was moved north by running 80 trains every day.

Battle

German soldiers in Łódź, December 1914.

On 11 November, Mackensen's German Ninth Army I and XXV Reserve Corps struck at the V Siberia Corps of Rennenkampf's First Army, located near Włocławek on the left bank of the Vistula, before they could prepare defensive positions. The German XX Corps advanced on Lubraniec so as to attack the V Siberian Corps flank. Rennenkampf was refused permission to send his VI Siberian Corps from Wyszogród to the aid of the V Siberian Corps, who had to retreat. On 12 November, a gap formed between the Russian II and V Siberian Corps, as the V Siberian Corps was forced to retreat to the southeast, which Mackensen took advantage of on 13 November. On 14 November, Mackensen ordered his entire German Ninth Army to advance, with his XI Corps attacking the Russian XXIII Corps northern flank, his XVII and XX Corps engaging the Russian II Corps, and his I Reserve Corps was to capture Łowicz, while containing the VI Siberian Corps. Yet, the Russians were still unaware of the German force attacking them, as they started their invasion of Silesia. On 15 November, the Germans captured Kutno, and on 16 November, crossed the Bzura, while Scheidemann ordered his Russian I and IV Corps to retreat towards Łódź. As the German XX Corps captured Stryków, the XXV Reserve Corps captured Brzeziny on 18 November, while XX and XVII engaged the defenses of Łódź. The Russian Fifth Army's XIX and V Corps were ordered north to Skierniewice, in support of Second Army's left flank. It was Plehve's Russian Fifth Army which prevented German encirclement of Łódź from the south. In the interim, Rennenkampf's Russian First Army remained stationary, content to guard the approach to Warsaw.

Grand Duke Nicholas's primary objective was saving Second Army and avoiding a repeat of the disaster at Tannenberg. On 16 November he ordered Wenzel von Plehve's Russian Fifth Army to abandon the proposed offensive into Silesia and to move northward towards Łódź; they marched 116 km (72 mi) in only two days. As soon as Hindenburg saw the transcript of this order, he knew that his maneuver had succeeded. Now seven Russian corps were defending the city. Plehve smashed into Mackensen's right flank on 18 November in bitter winter conditions (at times the temperature dropped as low as 10 °F (−12 °C).

By 19 November, the Germans were facing a numerically superior Russian force, with the intention of the Russians to attack the German penetration east of Łódź on 21 November. Yet, Mackensen still ordered his XX and XXV Reserve Corps to continue their effort to outflank the Russian Łódź defenses. The Germans made little progress on 20 November. On 21 November, a group commanded by Vladimir Slyusarenko in Rennenkampf's Russian First Army, advanced from Łowicz towards Bielawy and Strykow, in an attempt to close the 30 miles (48 km) gap between the Russian First and Second Armies. Slyusarenko's force consisted of the 43rd Infantry Division, the 6th Siberian Infantry Division, and 3 additional brigades. Only the German 19th Dragoon Regiment opposed this Russian threat to Friedrich von Scholtz's XX Corps rear, whose front faced southwest, south, and east.

The German Ninth Army's right wing was XXV Reserve Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General Reinhard von Scheffer-Boyadel, a 63-year-old who had been recalled from retirement. With Lieutenant General Manfred von Richthofen's, great uncle of the flying ace, cavalry in the van, they were pushing southeast between Łódź and the Vistula. Part of Rennenkampf's First Army was finally moving east to attack the Germans. Their repositioning was hindered when a makeshift bridge across the river collapsed, so they had to cross by ferry or on the nearest usable crossing 85 km (53 mi) upstream. Once over they attacked the weakly defended side of the corridor extending south from the German frontier to their advancing spearhead. The Russians reoccupied Brzeziny, cutting the roads used by German XXV Reserve Corps, whose progress south was now blocked by the Russian Fifth Army. Scheffer was ordered to stop advancing, but the order did not reach him. Suddenly it was the Germans who were ensnared in a pocket. Mackensen stopped attacking toward Łódź, turning to help to extricate them. The ecstatic Russians ordered trains for up to 20,000 prisoners, actually the German fighting strength in the pocket was about 11,000, but there were also 3,000 wounded. Other sources state that 50,000 prisoners were anticipated.

Hindenburg was alarmed by the intercepted wireless messages ordering the trains, but Mackensen assured him that they would prevail. In the pocket, Richthofen's cavalry, which had been leading the advance, reversed direction to screen the rear of three infantry columns Scheffer formed along the roads for the retreat back northwest. The frozen, hungry Germans pushed on through the icy night. They reached the outskirts of Breziny unobserved, because most of the 6th Siberian Division were huddling in their sleeping quarters, trying to keep from freezing. The Germans attacked at dawn with bayonets on unloaded rifles and occupied much of the town before a shot was fired. The commander of 6th Siberian Division, Gennings, broke down. Swamped with conflicting accounts of German movements, and with the weather too foggy and the days too short for aerial observation, Ruzsky issued a series of orders, each contradicting the one before.

Scheffer's left column, led by Karl Litzmann's 3rd Guards Infantry Division, had reached Breziny on the morning of 24 November. Litzmann wrote, on the retreat through Gałków Mały beforehand, "...the sleeping Russians were hauled out of the houses and taken prisoner." Litzmann led the "overwhelming and sudden" attack on Breziny, of which, "The success reinvigorated us," he later wrote. According to Buttar, "The confusion in command was widespread throughout the Russian formations involved in the fighting. It seems that the moves by Mackensen to aid the breakout by directing elements of XX Corps and I Reserve Corps to attack the encircling Russians distracted many local commanders, who directed their troops into positions from where they could cover any new German advance from the north, rather than a breakout from the encirclement." Scheffer's central column was led by Thiesenhausen's 49th Reserve Division messaged Scheffer, "There is no doubt: if we don't get through today, we will all be left lying on this ground, or will be en route for Siberia." By the end of the day, all three of Scheffer's columns were united in Brzeziny, including the right column consisting of Hans von der Goltz's 50th Reserve Division. In the words of Buttar, "It was the end of the encirclement of Scheffer's command."

Scheffer's XXV Reserve Corps was able to link up with the German XX Corps, when the Alexei Churin's Russian II Corps abandoned Strykow. Scheffer's men had escaped with their wounded, 12,000 Russian prisoners, and 64 captured Russian guns.

Inconclusive fighting continued until 29 November when at a conference with his front commanders Grand Duke Nicholas ordered his forces in Poland to withdraw to defensible lines nearer to Warsaw. Hindenburg learned from an intercepted wireless that Łódź was to be evacuated. The Germans moved in on 6 December, occupying a major industrial city with a population of more than 500,000 (about 70% of the population of Warsaw). German casualties were 35,000, while Russian losses were 70,000 plus 25,000 prisoners and 79 guns.

Aftermath

Mackensen, Scheffer and Litzmann were awarded the Pour le Mérite, while Litzmann earned the nickname 'the Lion of Brzeziny'. According to Buttar, "The encirclement of XXV Reserve Corps was broken for several reasons: lack of coordination by First, Second, and Fifth Armies; the extraordinary muddle of command in the Lowicz detachment; and Ruzsky's oscillation between his deep-rooted caution and his almost impulsive issuing of orders for all-out attacks." For the Russian Army, Łódź became the furthest point of advance towards Germany's heartland. Ruzsky retreated to a defensive line along the Bzura and Rawka rivers.

The Russians were able to avoid a full cauldron in a semi-circle and repel all attacks of their enemy, thereby avoiding a new Tannenberg. This meant that the Germans' encirclement plans were thwarted and the battle ended in a tactical victory for the Russians. The Germans themselves, e.g., Max Hoffmann and Ludendorff, admitted that the battle was not successful for them in terms of achieving operational and tactical objectives.

Hindenburg summed it up: "In its rapid changes from attack to defense, enveloping to being enveloped, breaking through to being broken through, this struggle reveals a most confusing picture on both sides. A picture which in its mounting ferocity exceeded all the battles that had previously been fought on the Eastern front!" The Polish winter bought a lull to the major fighting. A Russian invasion of Silesia must wait for spring. By this time, the Russians feared the German army, which seemed to appear from nowhere and to win a strategic victory despite substantial odds against them, while the Germans regarded the Russian army with "increasing disdain." Hindenburg and Ludendorff were convinced that if sufficient troops were transferred from the Western Front, they could force the Russians out of the war.

Thus, the battle turned out to be a kind of "Tannenberg on the contrary". If the East Prussian operation is a vivid example of a brilliant tactical victory and a strategic unsuccess for the Germans (as they moved from the west the needed troops in the form of 2 corps and 1 cavalry division that could be useful at the First Battle of the Marne), then the opposite is true with the Łódź operation. Technically, Łódź was a victory for Russia, but the Germans achieved their aim, and after the Russian withdrawal, Russia never came so close to German soil.

Order of Battle

Central Powers Forces

[North to South]

Russian Forces

Northwestern Front – Gen. Ruzsky

Notes

  1. ^ The Germans were unable to break through the defenses of the Russian troops
  2. ^ ”Moreover, Hindenburg sent a telegram to Wilhelm 2 on November 27, in which he blamed Falkenhayn for the failure of the Lodz operation”
  3. ^ „Behind all these events, it was forgotten that the winners of the operation were still the Russians, who managed to fend off and disrupt all German attacking planning”
  4. ^ Only the 1st and 25th corps took part in the battle
  5. ^ 265,273
  6. ^ Only German forces:
    • 9th army: 17 infantry and 5 cavalry division. total: 155,000–180,000
    • Support corps: Graudenz, Poznan, Breslau and Thorn. Total: 124,000 men
  7. ^ This is the most common estimate of casualties in the scientific literature, as well as the figure of buried German soldiers in November-December 1914 However, according to other estimates, losses can range from 25,700 to 42,000
  8. ^ The losses of the Germans alone amount to 121,520 excluding the Austrians, who also suffered heavy losses in the midst of the operation
  9. ^ See Russian invasion of East Prussia (1914) § Battle

References

  1. ^ Oleynikov 2016, p. 80.
  2. ^ Nelipovich 2017, p. 146.
  3. ^ Nelipovich 2021, p. 68.
  4. ^ Оськин М В. Лодзинская оборонительная операция. Осень 1914.М., 2007
  5. ^ Golovin 2014, p. 399.
  6. ^ Oskin 2024, p. 363.
  7. ^ Zayonchkovski 2002, p. 307.
  8. ^ Rickard, J. (23 February 2001), Battle of Lodz
  9. ^ Miltatuli 2017, p. 76.
  10. ^ Nelipovich 2021, p. 34.
  11. ^ Oleynikov 2016, pp. 74–75.
  12. ^ Nelipovich 2017, p. 144.
  13. ^ Oleynikov 2016, p. 75.
  14. ^ Bichanina 2018, p. 56.
  15. ^ Oleynikov 2016, p. 73.
  16. ^ Special Cable // The New York times.1914., 18 December.P.3
  17. ^ Reichsarchiv. Der Weltkrieg 1914-1918.B.6.S.360
  18. ^ Nelipovich 2017, pp. 144–145.
  19. ^ Oleynikov 2016, p. 250.
  20. ^ Nelipovich 2017, p. 191.
  21. ^ Reichsarchiv. Der Weltkrieg 1914-1918. B. 6. S. 248.
  22. ^ Oleynikov 2016, p. 235.
  23. ^ Корольков Г.К Лодзинская операция 2 ноября - 19 декабря 1914 г.,С.198
  24. ^ Buttar, Prit (2016). Collision of Empires, The War on the Eastern Front in 1914. Oxford: Osprey Publishing. pp. 360–387. ISBN 9781472813183.
  25. ^ Швинк О. Бои на р. Изер и у Ипра осенью 1914 г. Petrograd: Государственное издательство, 1922. p. 92.
  26. ^ Hindenburg, Paul von (1921). Out of my life. London: F. A. Holt. p. vol. I 157.
  27. ^ Buttar, Prit (2014). Collision of empires. The war on the Eastern Front in 1914. Oxford: Osprey Press. p. 349,351,360–361.
  28. ^ Gilbert, Martin (1994). The First World War: A Complete History. New York: Henry Holt and Company. p. 107. ISBN 080501540X.
  29. ^ Stone, Norman (1998) [1971]. The Eastern Front 1914-1917. London: Penguin. p. 104. ISBN 9780140267259.
  30. ^ Strachan, Hew (2001). The First World War. Volume I. To Arms. Oxford University Press. pp. 365–371.
  31. ^ Strachan 2001, p. 370.
  32. ^ Golovine, Nicholas N (1931). The Russian army in the World War. Oxford. p. 215.
  33. ^ Gray, Randall; Argyle, Christopher (1990). Chronicle of the First World War. New York: Oxford. p. vol. I, 282.
  34. ^ Денисенко А. А. "Предотвращение нового Танненберга": роль генерала от кавалерии П. А. Плеве в Лодзинской операции // Военно-исторический журнал. — Moscow: Редакционно-издательский центр "Красная Звезда", 2018. — Сентябрь (№ 9). — p. 5. — ISSN 0321-0626.
  35. ^ Rickard, J. (23 February 2001), Battle of Lodz, http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/battles_lodz.html
  36. ^ Алексей Олейников. "«Танненберг наоборот». Лодзинская операция Великой войны". btgv.ru. 20 July 2020.
  37. ^ Otto von Moser. Краткий стратегический обзор мировой войны 1914 - 1918 годов. Moscow: Высший военный редакционный совет, 1923. p. 47
  38. ^ Hindenburg 1921, vol. 1 p. 157.
  39. ^ Buttar 2014 p. 387.
  40. ^ Hindenburg 1921, vol. 1 pp. 164–166.
  41. ^ "Русская армия в Великой войне: Архив проекта". www.grwar.ru (in Russian).

Bibliography

  • Miltatuli, Pyotr (2017). Россия в эпоху царствование Николая 2 [Russia in the reign of Nicholas 2] (in Russian). Volume 2. Moscow: Русский издательский центр имени святого Василия Великого.
  • Golovin, Nikolai (2014). Россия в Первой мировой войне [Russia in First World War]. Вече. ISBN 978-5-4444-1667-9.
  • Bichanina, Zinaida (2018). Первая мировая война. Большой иллюстрированный атлас [The First World War: Great illustrated atlas]. Litres. ISBN 978-5-17-084566-8.
  • Tucker, Spencer The Great War: 1914–18 (1998)
  • Wulffen, Karl von, and P. B. Harm. The Battle of Lodz. Washington, D.C.: s.n., 1932. OCLC 36175892
  • Nelipovich, Sergei (2021). Лодзинская кампания 1914 года [Lodz campaign 1914]. Moscow: Квадрига. ISBN 978-5-91791-387-2.
  • Oleynikov, Alexei (2016). Россия-щит Антанты [Russia-Shield of Entente]. Foreword by Nikolai Starikov. St.Petersburg: Piter. ISBN 978-5-496-01795-4.
  • Zayonchkovski, Andrey (2002) [1929]. Первая Мировая Война [The First World War] (in Russian). St.Petersburg: Poligon. ISBN 5-89173-174-6.
  • Nelipovich, Sergei (2017). Русский фронт Первой Мировой войны: потери сторон 1914 [The Russian Front of the First World War: the losses of the sides in 1914]. Moscow: Квадрига. ISBN 978-5-91791-238-7.
  • Oskin, Maxim (2024). Осень 1914: схватка за Польшу [Autumn 1914: the Battle for Poland] (in Russian). Военно-историческая библиотека. Moscow: Вече. ISBN 978-5-4484-4924-6.

Media related to Battle of Łódź (1914) at Wikimedia Commons

51°46′37″N 19°27′17″E / 51.77694°N 19.45472°E / 51.77694; 19.45472

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