Azerbaijan (from 1991)
Soviet Union (until 1991)
Turkey (2020) (alleged by Armenia) Turkey (2020)
Artsakh Defence Army (until 2023)
Armed Forces of Armenia
Azerbaijani Armed Forces
Soviet Armed Forces (until 1991)The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is an ethnic and territorial conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the region of Nagorno-Karabakh, inhabited mostly by ethnic Armenians until 2023, and seven surrounding districts, inhabited mostly by Azerbaijanis until their expulsion during the 1990s. The Nagorno-Karabakh region was entirely claimed by and partially controlled by the breakaway Republic of Artsakh, but was recognized internationally as part of Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan gradually re-established control over Nagorno-Karabakh region and the seven surrounding districts.
Throughout the Soviet period, Armenians in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast were heavily discriminated against. The Soviet Azerbaijani authorities worked to suppress Armenian culture and identity in Nagorno-Karabakh, pressured Armenians to leave the region and encouraged Azerbaijanis to settle within it, although Armenians remained the majority population. During the glasnost period, a 1988 Nagorno-Karabakh referendum was held to transfer the region to Soviet Armenia, citing self-determination laws in the Soviet constitution. This act was met with a series of pogroms against Armenians across Azerbaijan, before violence committed against both Armenians and Azerbaijanis occurred.
The conflict escalated into a full-scale war in the early 1990s following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The war was won by Artsakh and Armenia, and led to occupation of regions around Soviet-era Nagorno-Karabakh. There were expulsions of ethnic Armenians from Azerbaijan and ethnic Azerbaijanis from Armenia and the Armenian-controlled areas. The ceasefire ending the war, signed in 1994 in Bishkek, was followed by two decades of relative stability, which significantly deteriorated in the 2010s. A four-day escalation in April 2016 resulted in hundreds of casualties but only minor changes to the front line.
In late 2020, the large-scale Second Nagorno-Karabakh War resulted in thousands of casualties and a significant Azerbaijani victory. An armistice was established by a tripartite ceasefire agreement on November 10, resulting in Azerbaijan regaining all of the occupied territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh as well as capturing one-third of Nagorno-Karabakh itself. Ceasefire violations in Nagorno-Karabakh and on the Armenian–Azerbaijani border continued following the 2020 war. Azerbaijan began blockading Nagorno-Karabakh in December 2022, and launched a large-scale military offensive in September 2023, resulting in a ceasefire agreement. Most ethnic Armenians fled, and Artsakh was officially dissolved on 1 January 2024.
Following the breakup of the Russian Empire, the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh formed an unrecognised polity known as the Karabakh Council in 1918. Due to Azerbaijani–British pressure, the Karabakh Council in August 1919 was forced to provisionally recognise the authority of Azerbaijan, pending the Paris Peace Conference's adjudication of the international borders of the republics within the South Caucasus. As the peace conference was inconclusive regarding Nagorno-Karabakh, the Azerbaijani governor-general Khosrov bey Sultanov, issued an ultimatum to the Armenians of Karabakh in early 1920, stipulating their acceptance of permanent inclusion into Azerbaijan. Leaders associated with the Republic of Mountainous Armenia and the Dashnak Party attempted to organize a rebellion against Azerbaijani rule, which failed and led to the massacre and displacement of Shusha's Armenian population. By 1921, Soviet authorities were in control of Nagorno-Karabakh who decided on the formation of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) within Soviet Azerbaijan.
In 1964, the Armenians of Karabakh sent a letter to leader of the USSR, Nikita Khrushchev, complaining about Azerbaijan's economic management of the region. They also requested that the NKAO and adjacent regions where the Armenian population is approximately 90% be reincorporated into the Armenian SSR or integrated into the RSFSR. The Nagorno-Karabakh Armenian intellectuals who wrote to the Kremlin were imprisoned, put under surveillance, or forced to leave Nagorno-Karabakh. All had lost their jobs and were removed from the Communist Party.
I tried to change the demographics in Karabakh. We encouraged Azeris living in neighbouring regions to move to Karabakh instead of to Baku. I made efforts to ensure that there would be more Azerbaijanis and less Armenians living there.
Throughout the Soviet period, Azerbaijani authorities implemented policies aimed at diluting the Armenian majority in Nagorno-Karabakh through various means, including border manipulations, encouraging the exodus of Armenians, and settling Azerbaijanis in the region. These efforts were part of a broader strategy to suppress Armenian culture and identity in Nagorno-Karabakh, leading to significant discrimination against the Armenian population. Former Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev later admitted to supporting some of these policies.
Despite these pressures, Armenians remained the majority in Nagorno-Karabakh when the USSR collapsed. Census data from the Soviet period reflects these demographic shifts. According to the 1979 Soviet census, 160,841 Azerbaijanis lived in Armenia, while 352,410 Armenians resided in Azerbaijan outside of Nagorno-Karabakh. By the time of the 1989 Soviet census, these numbers had declined, with 84,860 Azerbaijanis in Armenia and 245,045 Armenians in Azerbaijan outside of Nagorno-Karabakh. Thomas De Waal notes that in the mid-1980s, there were approximately 350,000 Armenians in Azerbaijan outside of Nagorno-Karabakh and around 200,000 Azerbaijanis in Armenia.
Teaching Armenian history in Nagorno-Karabakh was banned. Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians were persecuted for choosing to attend college in Armenia instead of Azerbaijan or for supporting the FC Ararat Yerevan football club instead of Neftchi Baku. The 1973 Soviet Top League final in which Ararat Yerevan defeated FC Dynamo Kyiv was not aired in Azerbaijan SSR, and Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians that listened to the match by radio were arrested and questioned by the KGB.
Amid Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1988–89, a 1988 Nagorno-Karabakh referendum was held to transfer the region to Soviet Armenia, citing self-determination laws in the Soviet constitution. In response, a series of pogroms were committed against Armenians throughout Azerbaijan, leading to the start of the Nagorno-Karabakh War. Professor Matt Qvortrup considered it hypocritical that Western Europe countries had eagerly recognised the succession of several states from Yugoslavia, ignoring the laws of territorial integrity, but simultaneously did not show the same interest for the Nagorno-Karabakh referendum, noting "the practice of independence referendums seemingly owes more to national interest than to adherence to principles of jurisprudence".
According to Stuart Kaufman, a professor of political science and international relations, and de Waal, the first instance of violence in the conflict occurred in October 1987 when an Azerbaijani official "punished" the Armenian-populated village of Chardakhly with a raid for protesting against the appointment of a new collective-farm director. During the raid, the village's women, children, and elderly were beaten up. In his 2003 book Black Garden, de Waal speculated that "[p]ossibly in reaction to such incidents", Azerbaijanis in Armenia (specifically in the districts of Ghapan and Meghri) were in November 1987 driven out of their homes, arriving at Baku in two freight cars. A number of Armenian scholars and investigative journalists, however, have scrutinized these alleged incidents and argued that, outside the claims made by Azerbaijani officials, there is no evidence, archival or otherwise, to corroborate such instances of mass violence taking place, at least prior to February 1988.
The First Nagorno-Karabakh War, also known as the Artsakh Liberation War in Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, was an armed conflict that took place in the late 1980s to May 1994, in the enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh in southwestern Azerbaijan, between the majority ethnic Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh backed by the Republic of Armenia, and the Republic of Azerbaijan. As the war progressed, Armenia and Azerbaijan, then both former Soviet Republics, entangled themselves in a protracted, undeclared war in the mountainous heights of Karabakh as Azerbaijan attempted to curb the secessionist movement in Nagorno-Karabakh.
On February 20, 1988, the enclave's parliament voted in favor of uniting with Armenia. The demand to unify with Armenia, which began anew in 1988, began in a relatively peaceful manner. As the Soviet Union's dissolution neared, the tensions gradually grew into an increasingly violent conflict between ethnic Armenians and ethnic Azerbaijanis. Both sides made claims of ethnic cleansing and pogroms conducted by the other.
The circumstances of the dissolution of the Soviet Union facilitated an Armenian separatist movement in Soviet Azerbaijan. The declaration of secession from Azerbaijan was the final result of a territorial conflict regarding the land. As Azerbaijan declared its independence from the Soviet Union and removed the powers held by the enclave's government, the Armenian majority voted to secede from Azerbaijan. The referendum held in 1991 was boycotted by the Azerbaijani population and had an electorate turnout of 82.1%, of which 99.9% voted in favor of independence. The referendum resulted in the unrecognized Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh.
Full-scale fighting erupted in the late winter of 1992. International mediation by several groups, including the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), failed to bring resolution. In the spring of 1993, Armenian forces captured territory outside the enclave itself, threatening to catalyze the involvement of other countries in the region. By the end of the war in 1994, the Armenians were in full control of most of the enclave and also held and currently control approximately 9% of Azerbaijan's territory outside the enclave. An estimated 353,000 Armenians from Azerbaijan and 500,000 Azerbaijanis from Armenia and Karabakh have been displaced as a result of the conflict. A Russian-brokered ceasefire was signed in May 1994, leading to diplomatic mediation.
The 2008 Mardakert clashes began on 4 March after the 2008 Armenian election protests, resulting in several score wounded and killed, with both sides declaring victory. It was the heaviest fighting between ethnic Armenian and Azerbaijani forces since the 1994 ceasefire after the First Nagorno-Karabakh War. Following the incident, on March 14 the United Nations General Assembly by a recorded vote of 39 in favour to 7 against adopted Resolution 62/243, demanding the immediate withdrawal of all Armenian forces from the occupied territories of Azerbaijan. The 2010 Nagorno-Karabakh clash was a scattered exchange of gunfire that took place on February 18 on the line of contact dividing Azerbaijani and the Karabakh Armenian military forces. As a result, three Azerbaijani soldiers were killed and one wounded. The 2010 Mardakert clashes were the deadliest for Armenian forces since the 2008 violence. Between 2008 and 2010, 74 soldiers were killed on both sides.
In late April 2011, border clashes left three Nagorno-Karabakh soldiers dead, while on 5 October, two Azerbaijani and one Armenian soldier were killed. In all during the year, 10 Armenian soldiers were killed. The following year, continued border clashes between the armed forces of Armenia and Azerbaijan took place from late April through early June. The clashes resulted in the deaths of five Azerbaijani and four Armenian soldiers. In all during 2012, 19 Azerbaijani and 14 Armenian soldiers were killed. Another report put the number of Azerbaijani dead at 20. Throughout 2013, 12 Azerbaijani and 7 Armenian soldiers were killed in border clashes.
In 2014, several border clashes erupted. By August, 27 Azerbaijani soldiers had died since the start of the year. On November 12, 2014, the Azerbaijani armed forces shot down a Nagorno-Karabakh Defense Army Mil Mi-24 helicopter over Karabakh's Agdam district. With the crash, 2014 became the deadliest year for Armenian forces since the 1994 ceasefire agreement, with 27 soldiers killed. Six Armenian civilians also died in 2014, while by the end of the year the number of Azerbaijanis killed rose to 39 (37 soldiers and 2 civilians). In 2015, 42 Armenian soldiers and 5 civilians were killed as border clashes continued. In addition, at least 64 Azerbaijani soldiers also died, according to Armenian sources.
Over the years, Azerbaijan had been growing impatient with the status quo. In this regard, propelled by oil and gas windfall, the country embarked in a military build-up. In 2015 alone, Baku spent USD $3 billion on its military, more than Armenia's entire national budget.
In early 2016, the most serious clashes until the 2020 war occurred (the 2016 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict). Between 1 and 5 April 2016, heavy fighting along the Nagorno-Karabakh frontline left 88 Armenian and 31–92 Azerbaijani soldiers dead. One Armenian and three Azerbaijani soldiers were also missing. In addition, 10 civilians (six Azerbaijani and four Armenian) were also killed. During the clashes, an Azerbaijani military helicopter and 13 unmanned drones were shot down and an Azerbaijani tank was destroyed, while Nagorno-Karabakh lost 14 tanks.
Continued clashes occurred in 2018. Three civilian volunteers were killed in a demining operation in Nagorno-Karabakh on 29 March 2018. 2020 saw a number of clashes, particularly heavy in July (July 2020 Armenian–Azerbaijani clashes).
Large-scale fighting began on the morning of 27 September, with an Azerbaijani offensive along the line of contact established in the aftermath of the first war. Clashes were particularly intense in the less mountainous districts of southern Nagorno-Karabakh. On the same day, Azerbaijan's Parliament declared a martial law and established curfews in several cities and regions following the clashes. Turkey provided military support to Azerbaijan, although the extent of this support has been disputed.
The war was marked by the deployment of drones, sensors, long-range heavy artillery and missile strikes, as well as by state propaganda and the use of official social media accounts in online information warfare. In particular, Azerbaijan's widespread use of drones was seen as crucial in determining the conflict's outcome. Numerous countries and the United Nations strongly condemned the fighting and called on both sides to de-escalate tensions and resume meaningful negotiations. Three ceasefires brokered by Russia, France, and the United States failed to stop the conflict.
Following the capture of Shusha, the second-largest city in Nagorno-Karabakh, a ceasefire agreement was signed, ending all hostilities in the area from 10 November 2020. Following the end of the war, an unconfirmed number of Armenian prisoners of war were captive in Azerbaijan, with reports of mistreatment and charges filed against them, leading to a case at the International Court of Justice.
.svg)
Casualties were high, officially in the low thousands. According to official figures released by the belligerents, Armenia and Artsakh lost 3,825 troops, with 187 servicemen missing in action, while Azerbaijan claimed 2,906 of their troops were killed, with 6 missing in action. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported the deaths of 541 Syrian fighters or mercenaries fighting for Azerbaijan. However, it was noted that the sides downplayed the number of their own casualties and exaggerated the numbers of enemy casualties and injuries.
The total number of reported civilian fatalities on both sides was at least 185; the whereabouts of 21 Armenian civilians remain unknown. Civilian areas, including major cities, were hit, particularly Stepanakert, Martuni, Martakert, Shushi in the Republic of Artsakh and Ganja, Barda and Tartar in Azerbaijan, with many buildings and homes destroyed.
An ongoing border crisis started on 12 May 2021, when Azerbaijani soldiers crossed several kilometers into Armenia in the provinces of Syunik and Gegharkunik, occupying between 50 and 215 square kilometers. Azerbaijan has not withdrawn its troops from internationally recognised Armenian territory despite calls to do so by European Parliament, United States and France – two of the three co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group.
Following the end of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, Azerbaijan has made numerous incursions into Armenian territory and has regularly violated the ceasefire agreement, provoking cross-border fights with Armenia. In order to strengthen the border against Azerbaijan's military incursions, Armenia allocated additional defense areas to border guards of the Russian Federal Security Service.
The crisis escalated in July 2021, with clashes taking place on the Armenia–Nakhchivan border, and in November 2021 in the Gegharkunik–Kalbajar area. In August 2021, Azerbaijani forces blockaded southern Armenia (Syunik) by closing the main north-south highway which interrupted all international transit with Iran and forced Armenia to develop alternative roads.
Although the mission has been condemned by Azerbaijan and Russia, the EU has sent a CSDP civilian monitoring mission to Armenia to contribute to stability along the border and deter offensives by Azerbaijan. The president of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, has made numerous threats to Armenia, making statements such as "Armenia must accept our conditions" if Armenians wish to "live comfortably on an area of 29,000 square kilometers," and "they must not forget that Armenian villages are visible from here."
The largest escalation occurred in September 2022, when Azerbaijan initiated its largest attack on the Republic of Armenia in the history of the conflict between the two countries. Since Azerbaijan's offensives, Armenia's borders with Azerbaijan have become militarized which has disrupted the livelihoods of residents in border communities: residents have been targeted and could no longer access farmlands, schools, water resources, relatives, or religious sites. Fearing for their safety, many Armenian villagers have moved away permanently.
Armenia has unsuccessfully requested that the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and Russia independently intervene due to Azerbaijan's military incursions in May 2021 and September 2022. The CSTO and Russia declined to provide assistance both times.
On 12 December 2022, under the guise of "environmental protests", Azerbaijan launched an illegal blockade of Nagorno-Karabakh. The Azerbaijani government sent citizens claiming to be "eco-activists" to block the Lachin corridor, the only road connecting Artsakh to Armenia and to the outside world. Civil servants, disguised military personnel, members of pro-government NGOs, and youth organisations were among the so-called "eco-activists." Only Azerbaijani journalists from state or pro-government media were permitted past checkpoints into the region.
From 26 March to 30 September 2023, the Azerbaijani government consolidated its blockade: seized strategic ground around the Lachin corridor both within Artsakh and Armenia, installed a military outpost that blocked a bypass dirt road that provided relief, blocked the old section of the Lachin corridor, and installed a checkpoint at the new section. Azerbaijan has ignored calls from the Russian peacekeepers to observe the 2020 ceasefire conditions and return to their initial territorial positions. Azerbaijan has also ignored calls from the International Court of Justice, the European Court of Human Rights, and other human rights organizations to restore freedom of movement across the Lachin corridor.
The blockade had severe consequences for the population: importation of food, fuel, and medicine was blocked, and the 120,000 residents of the region were trapped, which created a humanitarian crisis. Shortages of food, medicine, and electricity were widespread with emergency reserves were rationed, along massive unemployment and school closures.
During the blockade, Azerbaijan has deliberately damaged or cut various critical civilian infrastructure which supplied Artsakh: including gas, electricity, and Internet. The region was without gas from 22 March to 30 September 2023 and Artsakh authorities have resorted to daily 6-hour blackouts in order to ration the limited local electricity production, as Azerbaijan has prevented repair of a damaged supply line.
Azerbaijani President Aliyev has said that "Armenians living in Karabakh must either accept Azerbaijani citizenship or look for another place to live" and has threatened military action.
Local Armenian residents feared that the blockade aimed to expel them from their homeland and various human rights organizations and scholars specializing in genocide studies have warned of genocide risk factors.
On 19 September 2023, Azerbaijan launched a military offensive on Nagorno-Karabakh. One day after the offensive started, on 20 September, an agreement on establishing a complete cessation of hostilities in Nagorno-Karabakh was reached at the mediation of the Russian peacekeeping command in Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan held a meeting with representatives of the Artsakh Armenian community on 21 September in Yevlakh and a further meeting took place the following month. Ceasefire violations by Azerbaijan were nonetheless reported by both Artsakh and local residents in Stepanakert on 21 September.
An estimated 28,000–38,000 people were killed between 1988 and 1994.
Armenian military fatalities were reported to be between 5,856 and 6,000, while 1,264 Armenian civilians were also killed. Another 196 Armenian soldiers and 400 civilians were missing. According to the Union of Relatives of the Artsakh War Missing in Action Soldiers, as of 2014, 239 Karabakhi soldiers remain officially unaccounted for.
Azerbaijan stated 11,557 of its soldiers were killed, while Western and Russian estimates of dead combatants on the Azerbaijani side were 25,000–30,000. 4,210 Azerbaijani soldiers and 749 civilians were also missing. The total number of Azerbaijani civilians killed in the conflict is unknown, although 167–763 were killed on one day in 1992 by the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh's forces.
Although no precise casualty figures exist, between 1994 and 2009, as many as 3,000 people, mostly soldiers, had been killed, according to most observers. In 2008, the fighting became more intense and frequent. With 72 deaths in 2014, the year became the bloodiest since the war had ended. Two years later, between 1 and 5 April 2016, heavy fighting along the Nagorno-Karabakh front left 91 Armenian (11 non-combat) and 94 Azerbaijani soldiers dead, with two missing. In addition, 15 civilians (nine Armenians and six Azerbaijanis) were killed.
Azerbaijan stated 398 of its soldiers and 31 civilians were killed between 1994 and up to September 2020, right before the start of the 2020 conflict. In comparison, the Caspian Defense Studies Institute NGO reported 1,008 Azerbaijani soldiers and more than 90 civilians were killed between 1994 and 2016.
| Year | Armenia | Azerbaijan | Total |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2008 | N/A | N/A | 30 soldiers |
| 2009 | N/A | N/A | 19 soldiers |
| 2010 | 7 soldiers | 18 soldiers | 25 soldiers |
| 2011 | 10 soldiers | 4+ soldiers, 1 civilian | 14+ soldiers, 1 civilian |
| 2012 | 14 soldiers | 20 soldiers | 34 soldiers |
| 2013 | 7 soldiers | 12 soldiers | 19 soldiers |
| 2014 | 27 soldiers, 6 civilians | 37 soldiers, 2 civilians | 64 soldiers, 8 civilians |
| 2015 | 42 soldiers, 5 civilians | 64 soldiers | 77 soldiers, 5 civilians |
| 2016 | 108–112 soldiers, 9 civilians | 109 soldiers, 6 civilians | 217–221 soldiers, 15 civilians |
| 2017 | 22 soldiers | 19 soldiers | 41 soldiers |
| 2018 | 5–7 soldiers | 6 soldiers | 11–13 soldiers |
| 2019 | 4 soldiers | 6+ soldiers | 10+ soldiers |
In the two-month 2020 fighting, thousands were killed, primarily soldiers, but also almost two hundred civilians.
Between January and September 2020, 16 Azerbaijani and 8 Armenian soldiers, as well as an Azerbaijani civilian, were killed in sporadic clashes. On 27 September 2020, a new large-scale war erupted that lasted until 10 November. According to Azerbaijan, the fighting left 2,906 Azerbaijani soldiers and 100 civilians dead, while six servicemen were still missing. Armenian authorities stated the fighting had left 3,825 Armenian soldiers and 85 civilians dead, while 187 servicemen and 21 civilians were still missing. Additionally, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights documented the deaths of 541 Syrian mercenaries fighting for Azerbaijan. Two Russian soldiers were also killed when their helicopter was shot down by Azerbaijan by accident while flying in Armenian airspace near the border. In addition, a 13-year-old Russian citizen was killed during an Armenian missile strike on the city of Ganja.
Following the end of the war, eleven more Azerbaijani soldiers, six Azerbaijani civilians and one Russian peacekeeper were killed in clashes and landmine explosions in the region by the end of the year.
Twelve Azerbaijani civilians and two soldiers were killed in 2021, by landmine explosions. Seventeen Armenian and ten Azerbaijani soldiers were also killed in shoot-outs in the border area, while 38 Armenian soldiers were captured. Twenty-eight of the captured Armenian soldiers were subsequently released.
In 2022, three Armenian soldiers were killed and 14 wounded in an attack by Azerbaijani drones in Nagorno-Karabakh on 25 March.
Russia is officially neutral and has sought to play the role of a mediator. In its official statements, Russia calls for a peaceful settlement and restraint during skirmishes. British journalist Thomas de Waal has argued that there is an Azerbaijani narrative that Russia has "consistently supported the Armenian side." According to de Waal, Russia "has more supported the Armenian side," but there have been various "different Russian actors at different times supporting both sides in this conflict." He argues that President Boris Yeltsin did not "want to see the Armenian side be defeated, but he also didn't want to supply them with too many weapons." De Waal concluded in 2012 that "Russia [is] playing both sides", but "ultimately more in the Armenian side." Other commentators have argued that Russia plays both sides in the conflict. Svante Cornell argued in 2018 that Russia "had been playing both sides of the Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict to gain maximum control over both, a policy that continues to this day."
During the first Nagorno-Karabakh War, Russia was widely viewed as supporting the Armenian position due to it providing Armenia with military assistance, including arms and indirect logistical support. Russia supplied around $1 billion worth of weapons and, thus, "made a vital contribution to the Armenian victory." According to de Waal, "greater Russian support for the Armenians" was one of the main factors behind the Armenian victory. De Waal notes, "Yet it is not entirely clear how this support for the Armenians was translated on to the battlefield; to complicate things further, the Russians also gave some assistance to Azerbaijan."
Following the first Nagorno-Karabakh War and up until 2022, Russia was Armenia's main arms supplier and the two countries are military allies. Russia is sometimes described as Armenia's supporter in the conflict, however, this view is widely challenged as Russia extensively sells arms to Azerbaijan. Also, in February 2022, Aliyev and Putin signed a "Declaration of Allied Interaction" which elevated military ties between their countries and affirms "mutual respect for ... [the] territorial integrity and inviolability of the borders of the two countries" and obliges Azerbaijan and Russia to "refrain from any actions, including those carried out through third states, directed against each other." The agreement also has provisions for joint military operations and assistance between Russian and Azerbaijan, including personnel training and production, maintenance, repair, and modernization of military equipment. However, up until 2022 Armenia purchased Russian weaponry at a discount, while Azerbaijan pays the full price. In 2022, Russia suspended arms deliveries to Armenia.
Turkey is widely considered Azerbaijan's main supporter in the conflict. Svante Cornell wrote in 1998 that Turkey is the "only country that constantly expressed its support for Azerbaijan." It provided Azerbaijan "active military help" during the war. Turkey also supports Azerbaijan diplomatically. Turkish and Azerbaijani armed forces cooperate extensively and regularly hold military exercises. Azerbaijan has also bought weapons from Turkey.
Turkey closed its border with Armenia in April 1993 after Armenian forces captured Kalbajar. Prior to that, the border was only open "on demand and only for transferring the humanitarian aid (mainly wheat delivery) to Armenia and for the operation of the weekly Kars-Gyumri train, which had been crossing the Turkish–Armenian border since the days of the Soviet Union." Turkey has repeatedly refused to normalize and establish diplomatic relations with Armenia in solidarity with Azerbaijan over Karabakh. Turkey and Azerbaijan signed the "Shusha Declaration" in Shusha, a city that Azerbaijan captured during the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War. The declaration reaffirmed the military and economic cooperation between the countries and Turkish President Erdogan said the opening of a Turkish consulate in Shusha "would be a message to the world and especially to Armenia."
Iran is officially neutral and has sought to play the role of a mediator, most notably in 1992. In its official statements, Iran calls for a peaceful settlement and restraint during skirmishes. At the same time, Iranian officials have repeatedly reaffirmed their support for Azerbaijan's territorial integrity. Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated in 2020 that "While respecting the territorial integrity of the Azerbaijan Republic, Iran is fundamentally opposed to any move that would fuel conflict between the two neighbouring countries of the Azerbaijan Republic and Armenia."
During the war, "Iran was domestically torn in devising a policy", but de facto "pursued a policy that combined official neutrality with growing support for Armenia," according to Svante Cornell. Cornell argues that Iran has "pursued policies in the conflict inclined towards Armenia." However, Iran's tacit support for the Armenian side was limited to economic cooperation. Terhi Hakala noted in 1998 that "as a geopolitical counter-weight to Turkey, Iran has strongly supported Armenia, especially by alleviating the effects of the Turkish blockade." Cornell notes that during the war, Iran served as Armenia's "main purveyor of electricity and goods, and once the Armenian conquest of Karabakh had been completed, Iranian trucks began to supply most of the secessionist enclave's needs." According to Bahruz Balayev, "Iran supported the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and gave some humanitarian aid to the [Azerbaijani] refugees, but in the meantime widely cooperates with Armenia and even Karabakh Armenian authorities." Brenda Shaffer wrote that "Iran's cooperation with Armenia and its tacit support in the conflict with Azerbaijan over Karabagh strengthened Yerevan's actual and perceived power and consequently may have lessened its sense of urgency to resolve the conflict."
In 2013, Mohsen Rezaee, who was commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) during the war, claimed that he "personally issued an order [...] for the Republic of Azerbaijan army to be equipped appropriately and for it to receive the necessary training." Rezaee added that "Many Iranians died in the Karabakh War. In addition to the wounded, who were transported to [Iran], many of the Iranian martyrs of the Karabakh War are buried in Baku." In 2011, Hassan Ameli, a leading Iranian cleric, claimed that Iran provided Azerbaijan with arms and helped the Afghan mujaheddin move to Azerbaijan. The Iranian embassy in Armenia stated that they would not like unreliable information to affect friendly Armenian-Iranian relations: "We do not exclude the possibility that there are forces, which aim to create hindrances for our friendly relations." In October 2020, several protests erupted in Iranian cities, including the capital Tehran and Tabriz, in support of Azerbaijan, with many Iranian Azerbaijanis chanting pro-Azerbaijan slogans and protesting Iran's alleged arms support to Armenia via the Nordooz border crossing.
.jpg)
Thomas Ambrosio suggested in 2000 that the US "supported Azerbaijan's territorial integrity, but enacted policies that effectively supported Armenia's irredentist policies." Sergo Mikoyan argued in 1998 that the US response to the conflict has been "inconsistent, pulled in different directions by the legislative and executive branches of power." Congress was under the influence of the Armenian lobby, while the executive branch (the White House and the State Department) pursued a pro-Azerbaijani policy, which "reflects Turkish influence and the interests of oil companies." Richard C. Longworth and Argam DerHartunian expressed similar views.
Congress's pro-Armenian position was expressed in passing the Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act in 1992, which banned any assistance to Azerbaijan. It was effectively amended by the Senate in 2001 and waived by President George W. Bush starting from 2002. The US provides military aid to both countries. Between 2005 and 2016 Azerbaijan received $8.5 million for counternarcotics assistance and $11.5 million for counterterrorism aid. In the same period, Armenia received only $41,000 for counternarcotics assistance and none for counterterrorism aid. According to EurasiaNet, "Much of the money for Azerbaijan has been targeted toward naval forces, to reduce the risk that it could be used against Armenia." The Trump administration greatly increased the US military aid to Azerbaijan to around $100 million in fiscal years 2018–19, compared to less than $3 million in a year in FY 2016–17. The US aid is primarily "offered in the context of U.S. policy to increase pressure on Iran and focuses on Azerbaijan's Iranian border, but it also has implications for Armenia," according to Emil Sanamyan. In FY 2018, Armenia received $4.2 million in U.S. security assistance.
The US has also provided humanitarian aid to Artsakh (some $36 million between 1998 and 2010), including for demining. The humanitarian aid has been criticized by Azerbaijan for legitimizing the "illegal regime in the occupied lands and damages the reputation of the US as a neutral mediator."
In 1992, the OSCE "requested its participating states to impose an embargo on arms deliveries to forces engaged in combat in the Nagorno-Karabakh area." However, it is a "voluntary multilateral arms embargo, and a number of OSCE participating states have supplied arms to Armenia and Azerbaijan since 1992." The UN Security Council Resolution 85, passed in July 1993, called on states to "refrain from the supply of any weapons and munitions which might lead to an intensification of the conflict or the continued occupation of territory." According to SIPRI, "since 2002, the UN Security Council has no longer listed that it is 'actively seized of the matter'. As such, since 2002, it is assumed that the non-mandatory UN embargo is no longer active."
Russia has long been Armenia's primary arms supplier. Smaller suppliers include China, India, Ukraine, Greece, Serbia, Jordan (per Armenian MoD sources, denied by Jordan). In March 1992, Yagub Mammadov, chairman of Azerbaijani parliament, accused Syria and Lebanon of supplying weapons to Armenia.
According to SIPRI, Russia supplied 55% of Azerbaijan's weaponry in 2007–11, 85% in 2010–14 and 31% in 2015–19. Israel has become a major supplier, accounting for 60% of Azerbaijan's arms imports in 2015–19. Azerbaijan's other suppliers include Turkey, Belarus, Canada (via Turkey), Ukraine, Serbia, and Czech Republic (denied by the Czech authorities).
Several foreign groups fought on both sides in the intense period of fighting in 1992–94. According to Human Rights Watch (HRW), both sides used mercenaries during the war, namely "Russian, Ukrainian, and Belorussian mercenaries or rogue units of the Soviet/Russian Army have fought on both sides."
Azerbaijan made extensive use of mercenary pilots. According to a 1994 report from Human Rights Watch, "Most informed observers believe that mercenaries pilot most of Azerbaijan's air force."
Several foreign groups fought on the Azerbaijani side: Chechen militants, Afghan mujahideen, members of the Turkish ultranationalist Grey Wolves, and the Ukrainian nationalist and neo-fascist UNA-UNSO. The Chechen fighters in Karabakh were led by Shamil Basayev, who later became Prime Minister of Ichkeria (Chechnya), and Salman Raduyev. Basayev famously participated in the battle of Shusha in 1992. Saudi-born Ibn al-Khattab may have also joined them. The Afghan mujahideen were mostly affiliated with the Hezb-e Islami, led by Afghan Prime Minister Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. According to HRW, they were "clearly not motivated by religious or ideological reasons" and were, thus, mercenaries. The recruitment of Afghan mujahideen, reportedly handled by paramilitary police chief Rovshan Javadov, was denied by Azerbaijani authorities. They first arrived to Azerbaijan in fall 1993 and numbered anywhere between 1,500 and 2,500 or 1,000 and 3,000. Armenia alleged that they were paid for by Saudi Arabia. Afghan mujahideen constituted the most considerable influx of foreign fighters during the war. Some 200 Grey Wolves were still present in the conflict zone as of September 1994 and were engaged in training Azerbaijani units.
Some 85 Russian Kuban Cossacks and around 30 Ossetian volunteers fought on the Armenian side. In May 2011, a khachkar was inaugurated in the village of Vank in memory of 14 Kuban Cossacks who died in the war. Ossetian volunteers reportedly came from both South Ossetia (Georgia) and North Ossetia (Russia). No less than 12 diaspora Armenian volunteers fought and four diaspora fighters died in the war. According to David Rieff, members of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnaks), "including a substantial number of volunteers from the diaspora, did a great deal of the fighting and dying." Former members of the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) also participated in the war.
Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh Republic) received diplomatic recognition and diplomatic support, especially during the 2016 clashes, from three partially recognized states: Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria.
During the war, Greece adopted a pro-Armenian position and supported it in international forums. During the April 2016 and July 2020 clashes, Cyprus condemned Azerbaijan for violating the ceasefire.
Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosyan reportedly told the Greek ambassador in 1993 that France and Russia were Armenia's only allies at the time. According to a US State Department cable released in 2020, the French ambassador to the UN, Jean-Bernard Mérimée, succeeded in changing the wording of the UNSC Resolution 822 to state that it was "local Armenian forces", not "Armenian forces" that occupied Kalbajar. He also suggested treating the Armenian capture of Kalbajar not under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (an act of aggression), but Chapter VI (a dispute that should be settled peacefully).
Azerbaijan has received explicit diplomatic support in the conflict from several countries and international organizations. Azerbaijan's strongest diplomatic supporters are Turkey and Pakistan, which is the only UN member state not to have recognized Armenia's independence in support for Azerbaijan. Turkish-backed unrecognized Northern Cyprus (Turkish Cyprus) also supports Azerbaijan. The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the Turkic Council have repeatedly supported the Azerbaijani position. Some member states of these organizations, namely Uzbekistan and Saudi Arabia have voiced support for Azerbaijan's position on their own repeatedly. Lebanon, on the other hand, has not supported OIC's pro-Azerbaijani resolutions.
Azerbaijan has received diplomatic support, namely for its territorial integrity, from three post-Soviet states that have territorial disputes: Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova. These three countries and Azerbaijan form the GUAM organization and support the Azerbaijani position in the format as well. Serbia, with its own territorial dispute over Kosovo, also explicitly supports Azerbaijan's territorial integrity.
Two other post-Soviet states, Kazakhstan and Belarus tacitly support Azerbaijan's position, especially within the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and the CSTO, despite nominal alliance with Armenia.
Both Palestine and Israel have voiced support for Azerbaijan.
On March 14, 2008, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution which "reaffirmed Azerbaijan's territorial integrity, expressing support for that country's internationally recognized borders and demanding the immediate withdrawal of all Armenian forces from all occupied territories there." It was adopted by a vote of 39 in favor to 7 against, while most countries either abstained or were absent. It was backed mostly by Muslim states (31 were members of the OIC). Non-Muslim states that supported the resolution included three post-Soviet states: Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, and five other nations: Cambodia, Colombia, Myanmar, Serbia, and Tuvalu. Thus, it was supported by seven OSCE members; one NATO member (Turkey) and no EU member state.
It was opposed by Angola, Armenia, France, India, Russia, the United States, and Vanuatu. The OSCE Minsk Group co-chair countries (France, US, Russia) voted against the resolution. They argued that it "selectively propagates only certain of [the basic] principles to the exclusion of others, without considering the Co-Chairs' proposal in its balanced entirety." The co-chair countries called it a unilateral resolution, which "threatens to undermine the peace process," but reaffirmed their "support for the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, and thus do not recognize the independence of NK."
In 2017, an Azerbaijani laundromat money-laundering scheme organized by Azerbaijan was revealed by the OCCRP. The report revealed that between 2012 and 2014, Azerbaijan created a slush fund of USD $2.9 billion used to bribe European and American politicians, journalists, lawmakers, and academics to lobby for Azerbaijani interests abroad, including promoting a pro-Azerbaijan agenda for the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. This form of bribery has been referred to as "caviar diplomacy". The laundering scheme has operated by wiring millions of euros into the private bank accounts of influential Western figures and by providing them with luxurious trips to Azerbaijan. The European Azerbaijani Society (TEAS) lobbying group has played a large role in this by hiring European PR professionals, pariliment members, and former ministers.
Azerbaijani-American businessman Adil Baguirov had been lobbying in Washington through secret funding from Azerbaijan’s state oil company since 2013. Baguirov runs the non-profit Houston-based US Azeris Network, which received a $253,150 transfer after organizing and hosting a conference in Baku attended by 10 American members of Congress. In 2003, Baguirov began working as Special Advisor on Russia and the former Soviet Union to Congressman Curt Weldon. Weldon and another Congressman, Solomon Ortiz, both founded the Congressional Azerbaijan Caucus in 2004. The Congressional Azerbaijan Caucus was a frequent recipient of Azerbaijani laundromat funds. From 2008 to 2016, Baguirov was invited almost annually by the United States House Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs to suggest economic and military aid budgets for Azerbaijan and Armenia. In 2008, Baguirov lobbied for greater aid to be given to Azerbaijan, citing equity and neutrality. But by 2012, Baguirov lobbied for aid to Armenia to be reduced to zero, while requesting that Azerbaijan be granted $26 million from USAID and $3.9 million in military aid.
It was revealed in 2017 that German politician and former Parliamentary State Secretary Eduard Lintner had lobbied on behalf of the regime in Azerbaijan and been involved in the laundromat scandal. In 2009, Lintner had founded the Society for Promoting German-Azerbaijani Relations, which was funded by the Azerbaijani government and lobbied for Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
The 2012 laundromat investigation revealed several bank transfers in 2012, totalling more than USD $9 million, made to the Hungarian MKB Bank account in Budapest right around the time when, amid international controversy, the Hungarian government extradited the convicted Azerbaijani murderer Ramil Safarov to Azerbaijan. Several media outlets suggested a connection between Viktor Orbán's visit to Baku in June and the first instalment of $7.6 million transferred to the bank account in July, since by the end of August Safarov was handed over to Azerbaijan.
In January 2017, following a series of critical reports and concern expressed by many members of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), the Assembly's Bureau decided to set up an independent, external body to investigate allegations of corruption in PACE. The investigation body's final report was published in April 2018, finding "strong suspicions of corruptive conduct involving members of the Assembly" and naming a number of members and former members as having breached the Assembly's Code of Conduct. Many of the members or former members mentioned in the report were sanctioned: four members were deprived of certain rights and 14 members, accused of accepting gifts and bribes from the government of Azerbaijan, were expelled from the Assembly's premises for life.
Two major armistices occurred upon following the First and Second Nagorno-Karabakh War. Both ceasefires were brokered by Russia, with the first also being mediated by the OSCE Minsk Group (Russia, US, France).
A Russian-brokered ceasefire was signed in May 1994 and peace talks, mediated by the OSCE Minsk Group have been held ever since by Armenia and Azerbaijan. The 1994 Bishkek Protocol called for both sides to cease hostilities and engage in dialogue aimed at demilitarization of the region, return of refugees, and the creation of a CIS peacekeeping force. Azerbaijan has repeatedly accused the Minsk Group (Russia, US, France) of being pro-Armenian. In 1996, when France was chosen by the OSCE to co-chair the Minsk Group, Azerbaijan asked the OSCE to reconsider the decision because France was perceived by Azerbaijan as pro-Armenian. Svante Cornell argued in 1997 that France, the US and Russia are "more or less biased towards Armenia in the conflict." In 2018 Azerbaijan accused the US and France of bias for allowing Bako Sahakyan, the then president of Artsakh, to visit their countries.
On 9 November 2020, Armenia and Azerbaijan signed a ceasefire under mediation from Russia, with the Republic of Artsakh also agreeing to end hostilities. According to the agreement, both sides retained control of the positions they held at midnight. Armenia returned the territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh that it had occupied since the 1990s. Azerbaijan also retained control over one-third of Nagorno-Karabakh proper that it had captured during the war: including Shusha and Hadrut. In total, the Armenian side lost roughly 75% of the territories in and around Nagorno-Karabakh that it controlled prior to the war. Until 2020, an independent Azerbaijan had never exercised de facto control over the region.
Approximately 2,000 Russian soldiers were deployed as peacekeeping forces around Nagorno-Karabakh with a mandate of at least five years. The peacekeepers were also given mandate over the Lachin corridor which following remains the only passage between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. The alternative Vardenis–Martakert route has been closed by Azerbaijan since it took control of the Dadivank-Sotk section (in Kalbajar) during the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War (2020). As per the agreement, Armenia returned all territory it had occupied around Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan retained control over one-third of Nagorno-Karabakh proper that it captured. The 2020 agreement gave Russian peacekeepers a temporary but renewable mandate to the region.
Following the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, both Russia and the European Union have increased their presence in Armenia along the border with Azerbaijan in order to improve stability of the border and deter offensives from Azerbaijan. Upon Armenia's request, Russia's Federal Security Service expanded its patrols within Armenia and the EU contributed a civilian monitoring mission. However, while both entities have deterred the possibility of full-scale warfare, they have been unable to fully prevent Azerbaijan's goals.
Russia and the European Union have criticized each other's presence within Armenia. The European Union encouraged Armenia to seek alternative security alliances given "Russia's alleged readiness to guarantee the security of Armenia has proven to be non-existent." Russia, in turn, criticized the EU and Armenia for implementing the civilian monitoring in Armenia and claims it is an effort by the West to diminish Russia's power in the region.
A day after the resuming of hostilities, a ceasefire agreement was announced with the government of the Republic of Artsakh agreed to disarm and to enter into talks with the government of Azerbaijan regarding the reintegration of the territory.
On 12 June 2024, the Russian peacekeepers completed their withdrawal from the Nagorno-Karabakh region which had started in April that year, following an agreement between President Putin and his Azerbaijani counterpart Aliyev.
The political status of Nagorno-Karabakh remained unresolved from its declaration of independence from the Soviet Union in 1991 until its dissolution in 2024. Within the Soviet Union, the region was an ethnic Armenian autonomous oblast of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic. From 1994 to 2024, the United Nations Security Council, OSCE Minsk Group, and other bodies made various statements and proposed dialogue initiatives; none of them successful. The Republic of Artsakh has not been recognized by any country, including Armenia, although international mediators and human rights organizations have emphasized self-determination for the local Armenian population, both as an internationally recognized right but also as a form of genocide prevention.
Following the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, Azerbaijan has rescinded its offer of special status or autonomy to its ethnic Armenian residents and instead insisted on their "integration" into Azerbaijan. In 2023, Azerbaijani President Aliyev said that Armenian residents of Nagorno-Karabakh must be "reintegrated" as "normal citizen[s] of Azerbaijan" and that "the [special] status [for Armenians] went to hell. It failed; it was shattered to smithereens. It is not and will not be there. As long as I am president, there will be no status." Aliyev also threatened military action.
Despite being offered Azerbaijani citizenship, Artsakh residents did not trust Azerbaijan's guarantees of security due to the country's history of human rights abuses, Armenophobia and lack of rights to ethnic minorities. Various human rights observers, scholars specializing in genocide studies, and politicians considered the blockade of Artsakh a form of ethnic cleansing and warned of the risk of genocide. Many international observers also did not consider Azerbaijan's claim that Artsakh Armenians could live safely under Aliyev's regime to be credible.
Political analyst Eric Hacopian has said that "[Expecting Armenians to submit to the rule of a nationalistic and undemocratic Azeri government] is the equivalent of asking 100,000 Israelis to live under Hamas." Caucuses expert, Laurence Broers wrote "the blockade [of Nagorno-Karabakh] renders irrelevant any talk of the civil integration of Karabakh Armenians. It vindicates the worst fears of the Karabakh Armenian population." Political analysts predict that Azerbaijan would arbitrarily detain and torture civilians, under the pretext of their association with the Artsakh government or with previous wars, if it took control over the region. At least two incidents of Azerbaijani forces detaining Armenian residents around Azerbaijan's military checkpoint have been confirmed.
Sporadic clashes became frequent by the first months of 1991, with an ever-increasing organization of paramilitary forces on the Armenian side, whereas Azerbaijan still relied on the support of Moscow. [...] In response to this development, a joint Soviet and Azerbaijani military and police operation directed from Moscow was initiated in these areas during the Spring and Summer of 1991.
... units of the 4th army stationed in Azerbaijan and Azeri OMONs were used in "Operation Ring", to empty a number of Armenian villages in Nagorno-Karabakh in April 1991.
... Operation 'Ring' as a combined Soviet-Azerbaijan operation to weaken Armenian resistance in the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave.
Armenia has said that Turkey was directly involved in the fighting in and around Nagorno-Karabakh, and that a Turkish F-16 fighter shot down an Armenian jet. Turkey denied those accusations.
Turkey's support for Azerbaijan has been vital, and Azerbaijan's superior weaponry and battlefield advances have reduced its incentive to reach a lasting peace deal. Ankara denies its troops are involved in fighting but Aliyev has acknowledged some Turkish F-16 fighter jets remained in Azerbaijan after a military drill this summer, and there are reports of Russian and Turkish drones being used by both sides.
When the Soviet Union broke up in 1991 [...] the Karabakh conflict escalated further, from guerrilla warfare to full-scale conventional combat.
As low-intensity fighting continues...
Low-intensity skirmishes since 1994...
The real war, which began on September 27th,...
The past two weeks have provided one of the starkest examples of the consequences of this: the re-eruption of full-scale war between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh.
Overlaying what is fundamentally a territorial dispute are the consequences of the 1991–94 war: a decisive Armenian military victory resulting in Armenian control of Nagorny Karabakh and the further occupation of seven districts surrounding it.
The 1994 cease-fire [...] ended in political stalemate.
Armenia and Azerbaijan have been in a cold war since the cessation of large-scale conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh during 1988–94...
...as cold war between Armenia and Azerbaijan deepens.
As characterized by Karabagh's defence minister, the current post-war situation in the region is 'a cold war between Azerbaijan and Karabagh'.
The unresolved secessionist conflict between Armenia (position 3) and Azerbaijan (position 10) over the Nagorno-Karabakh region continues to keep militarisation in the South Caucasus at a very high level.
The so-called Line of Contact between the two sides became the most militarised zone in the wider Europe, bristling with tanks and heavy artillery.
On 12 May 2021, troops from Azerbaijan temporarily entered the territory of Armenia, which amounts to a violation of the territorial integrity of Armenia and of international law
The offensive was seen as a major victory for Azerbaijan, which won a 2020 war with Armenia and has since sought to repopulate Karabakh.
Under the agreement, confirmed by both sides and effective from 1 pm (0900 GMT) on Wednesday, separatist forces will disband and disarm and talks on the future of the region and the ethnic Armenians who live there will start on Thursday.
Armenia is de facto united with Nagorno-Karabakh, an unrecognized state, in a single entity.
The mostly Armenian population of the disputed region now lives under the control of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, a micronation that is supported by Armenia and is effectively part of that country.
Following the war, the territories that fell under Armenian control, in particular Mountainous Karabakh itself, were slowly integrated into Armenia. Officially, Karabakh and Armenia remain separate political entities, but for most practical matters the two entities are unified."
While often portrayed as separate forces, Armenia's Armed Forces and the "Artsakh Defense Army," totaling up to 65,000 active personnel, are in practice one force with a single Command-and-Control (C2) system.
There are no exact casualty figures since 1994, but most observers agree that as many as 3,000 people, mostly soldiers, have died. Crisis Group phone interview, Jasur Sumerinli, military expert, August 2009.
The Karabakh conflict is an ethno-territorial conflict....
...local factors are still the main driver of the conflict and that Russia has equities on both sides.
...the peaceful resolution of the Artsakh conflict.
Of all the documents I have seen, there is no direct evidence of Stalin doing or saying something in those 12 days in the summer of 1921 that [resulted in this decision on Karabakh]. A lot of people just assume that since Stalin was an evil person, it would be typical of someone evil to take a decision like that.
In 1923, within the territorial borders of Azerbaijan, Mountainous Karabakh was given autonomy, and the regions of Shamkhar, Khanlar, Dashkesan and Shahumian, where the Armenian population is predominant (approximately 90 per cent), were directly incorporated into the Azerbaijan SSR. Thus, the Armenians of Karabagh were cut off from the Armenian SSR and Mountainous Karabakh Autonomous Republic failed to include all Armenian regions. The rights of the autonomous region were gradually curtailed and presently are almost entirely abrogated. The Armenian population of the Azerbaijani SSR has been subjected to chauvinistic policies creating extremely unfavorable conditions of life.
The solution proposed by the [Karabakh uezdy] conference was similar to previous suggestions, but it also called for the creation of a Karabakh Oblast', a region that would encompass both mountainous and lowland parts of Karabakh. It offered a way in which the creation of a predominantly Armenian autonomous unit in the mountainous part of the region could be avoided. During 1921, the position of the Azerbaijani leadership regarding Karabakh autonomy had been that suppression of banditry in the region would solve the ethnic conflict, and that there would be no need to grant autonomy to the Armenian-populated part of Karabakh. This tactic was successful in the short term.
The borders were to be drawn before 15 August by a mixed commission...but without the participation of either Yerevan or Moscow. All would be presided over by Karaiev. Under such circumstances, the Armenians could expect to be grossly disappointed. On the one hand...they excluded, on the west, the 'corridor' made up of Lachin, Kelbajar, and Kedabek, which had been carefully emptied of its Armenian population to separate Mountainous Karabagh from Armenian Zangezur. On the other hand, in the north, without any justification, they removed the districts of Shamkhor, Khanlar, Dashkesan and Shahumian.. where the Armenian population was predominant (about 90 per cent)... From Shamkhor in the north to Shahumian in the south, Armenian villages in these districts have been systematically emptied...Mountainous Karabagh delimited in this way is only a portion of what had always been Armenian Karabagh, which itself is only a part of what was included in the ancient Armenian provinces of Artsakh and Utik...The spectre of 'Nakhichevanization' haunts...Mountainous Karabagh, which had 125,000 inhabitants in 1926 who were 89 percent Armenian. This region has become an 'enclave' since the 'cleansing' of the Hagaru Valley in order to separate Karabagh from Zangezur by a narrow strip emptied of Armenians...Azerbaijan still contained a large Armenian minority. Aside from the 'bastion' of the Autonomous Region of Mountainous Karabagh, Armenians were numerous in Baku and in the region north of the Autonomous Region, up to Shamkhor, where the Armenian villages had been deliberately left outside the frontiers drawn in 1923 and, thereby, subjected to direct Azerbaijani authority. From north to south, these areas had already largely been 'swept clean,' with the exception of the area of Shahumian, the northern gateway to the Autonomous Region. The Azerbaijani plan was clearly described in the declaration by the Karabagh Committee on 2 December 1988: 'Exploiting the anarchic situation, the Azerbaijani authorities are about to unleash a monstrous programme: to expel Armenians from their several millennia old homes in Gandzak and the areas north of Artsakh, in preparation for an invasion of Mountainous Karabagh.' Already about 120,000 Armenians have left Azerbaijan, and 50,000 have sought refuge in Armenia and the others in the North Caucasus and Central Asia.
The borders between Armenia and Artsakh were manipulated such that Armenia could have no direct link with Artsakh.
So after the ethnic cleansing of Nagorno-Karabakh that the Azeris undertook in 1991, Azeris...were settled in formerly Armenian towns and villages to reduce the oblast's overwhelmingly Armenian complexion.
Azerbaijan's former president Heydar Aliyev admitted in a 2002 interview that he had tried to increase the number of Azerbaijanis and reduce the number of Armenians living in the region while he was a Soviet Communist Party Administrator.
...confirmation of the deliberate demographic change policy pursued by the Azerbaijani authorities in Karabakh comes from a 2002 interview with Azerbaijani president Heidar Aliyev, who in 1969 became the head of Soviet Azerbaijan: 'I talk about a period when I was the First Secretary [of the Azerbaijani CP] and helped a lot at that time with the development of Nagorno-Karabakh....I tried to change the demographics there. Nagorno-Karabakh petitioned for the opening of an institute of higher education there. [In Azerbaijan] everybody was against it. After deliberations, I decided to open one, but on the condition that there would be three sectors—Azerbaijani, Russian, and Armenian. After [the institute] opened, we no longer sent Azerbaijanis from the neighboring regions to Baku [and] instead sent them there [to Karabakh]. [We also] opened a large shoemaking factory there. In Stepanakert itself, there was no workforce, so we sent Azerbaijanis from the surrounding districts. With these and other measures, I tried to increase the number of Azerbaijanis in Nagorno-Karabakh, and the number of Armenians decreased. Those who worked at that time in Nagorno-Karabakh know about it.'
On 27 September 2020, Azerbaijan launched a military offensive, resulting in fighting that spans much of the line of contact in the breakaway region of Nagorno-Karabakh...
{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: bot: original URL status unknown (link)
The Azerbaijani offensive against Armenian forces is its most ambitious since the war between the two sides formally ended in 1994.
'Turkey is already supporting Azerbaijan militarily, technical assistance and arms sales, providing critical military support, especially in terms of armed drones and technical expertise', said Turkish analyst Ilhan Uzgel.
{{cite news}}: CS1 maint: bot: original URL status unknown (link)
The number of victims of the 44-day war is 3825 by today's data.
Some open source estimates put it at a total of 145 square kilometers (56 square miles) whereas others indicate 127 square kilometers (49 square miles).
Azerbaijan has now occupied roughly 50 square kilometres of Armenian territory since the 2020 conflict.
The latest Azerbaijani attack...resulted in...the occupation of some 60 square kilometers of Armenian territory within two days.
A #CivilNetCheck visual investigation confirmed, through the study of satellite imagery, that the new road leading to the Azerbaijani positions was built last May. This means that the advance by the Azerbaijani troops into Armenia was concealed from the public for nearly a year.
Local government officials and farmers said Tegh lost a large part of its agricultural land and pastures. Some of them said that the Azerbaijani military made bigger territorial gains than is admitted by official Yerevan.
Since the end of the Second Nagorno Karabakh War, Azerbaijan has regularly violated the ceasefire agreement, provoking firefights with Armenia along the border.
This is now the second time ever that Moscow has accused Azerbaijan of violating the ceasefire, after it called out Baku for its actions on 26 March.
'Whatever will happen there, the border will be where we say it should be. They [the Armenians] know that we can do it. No one will help them, not the retired French policemen from Europe, not others, not anyone else', said Aliyev, apparently referring to the EU Monitoring Mission in Armenia.
'Many Armenians believe there will be a spring offensive by Azerbaijan. If this doesn't happen, our mission is already a success,' Markus Ritter, the German head of the monitoring mission, told Germany's Deutsche Welle broadcaster this week.
Azerbaijan has now occupied roughly 50 square kilometres of Armenian territory since the 2020 conflict.
On 18 March, Azerbaijan's President Ilham Aliyev declared that 'Armenia must accept our conditions' if Armenians wish to 'live comfortably on an area of 29,000 square kilometers.'
Aliyev said on Sunday that apart from recognizing Azerbaijani sovereignty over Karabakh Yerevan must also meet a number of other conditions set by Azerbaijan. That includes delimiting the Armenian-Azerbaijani border on Baku's terms and opening a corridor to the Nakhichevan exclave, he said. 'They must not forget that Armenian villages are visible from here,' he added during a visit to the border town of Lachin.
We are implementing the Zangezur Corridor, whether Armenia wants it or not. If Armenia wants it, then the issue will be resolved easier, if it does not want it, we will decide it by force.
It is enough to look at the continuous pattern of diverse threats, ranging from military to economic, made by the Aliyev regime to understand who the aggressor is and what the goals are. For example, Aliyev recently threatened full-scale war with Armenia if the country tries to pursue any international discussions or negotiations about the status of Nagorno-Karabakh and the thousands of Armenians who still live in their indigenous lands under the protection of the Russian peacekeeping force.
At midnight on Tuesday Azerbaijan launched the largest attack on the Republic of Armenia (unrelated to the line of contact of Nagorno Karabakh) in the entire history of the conflict between these two countries.
The September clashes were the most serious armed incident between Armenia and Azerbaijan since the 2020 Karabakh war...however, this time the clashes took place along their shared southern border (not the contested region).
It is the first time that Azerbaijan has struck targets in large numbers inside Armenian territory; most fighting between the two sides has previously taken place in and around Nagorno-Karabakh, internationally recognized as Azerbaijani territory.
...Azerbaijan launched a series of unprecedented attacks against targets inside southern Armenia this week...
Unrecognised, undemarcated or otherwise contested borderlines are used as instruments by Russian and Azerbaijani forces, respectively, to destabilise, create 'new realities', and enforce concessions. Everyday livelihoods in the conflict zones are violently disrupted as a result: villagers can no longer safely access farmlands, schools, water resources, relatives or religious sites.
Azeri soldiers routinely fire on Armenian farmers as they tend to their crops, disrupting their daily lives.
All along Armenia's newly militarized eastern border, fearful villagers have stopped using some land that they had previously employed for cultivation or pasture. Incidents of shooting and cattle rustling have become common over the past two years, some resolved through Russian mediation, some not.
Armenian civilians of Nagorno Karabakh and surrounding regions along the Armenian-Azerbaijani border are threatened by Azerbaijan's military and face violence if they try to leave Armenian territory within disputed areas.
For the Armenians who live in the border regions, the effects have been manifold. They have lost access to farmland or pastures they used to use; many have sold, slaughtered, or relocated livestock as a result. Some human residents have moved away, as well, fearing for the future here.
...the border areas between Armenia's Syunik and Gegharkunik provinces, and Azerbaijan's newly established East Zangezur region have become militarised front lines.
[Azerbaijan] launched a major incursion into the Republic of Armenia in 2022, and in early 2023 it [Azerbaijan] further isolated the ethnic Armenians who remained in Nagorno-Karabakh by blocking a crucial road link under the guise of "environmental protests".
The so-called "environmentalists" who have blocked the Lachin corridor have shown themselves to be little interested in environmentalism. They chant "Karabakh is Azerbaijan" and carry signs supporting Aliyev and the Azerbaijani military....This is all a far cry from what one would see at an environmental protest.
Tom de Waal, a senior fellow at Carnegie Europe and author of several books about the conflict, has claimed that the environmental protestors are akin to the "Little Green Men" used by Russia to occupy Crimea in 2014 while denying it was invading.
Although this venture is being spearheaded by alleged environmental activists demanding permission to monitor Karabakh's rare metal deposits...it would be impossible to carry out such an action in Azerbaijan without the cooperation of the authorities.
The European Parliament adopted the Implementation of the common foreign and security policy – annual report 2022 resolution on January 18. The plenary session also adopted an amendment, saying the European parliament "strongly denounces Azerbaijan's illegal blockade of the Lachin corridor, in violation of the trilateral statement of 9 November 2020, as it threatens to precipitate an intentional humanitarian crisis for the people of NagornoKarabakh; demands that the Azerbaijani authorities restore freedom of movement through the Lachin corridor with immediate effect."
Azerbaijan did not allow relief supplies to and medical evacuations from Nagorno-Karabakh [Artsakh] for the second consecutive day on Friday, aggravating a humanitarian crisis in the Armenian-populated region effectively cut off from the outside world since December [2022].
According to Tom de Waal, a senior fellow at Carnegie Europe and author of several books on the conflict, the demonstrators had 'evidently been sent there by the government in Baku,' likening them to the 'little green men' Russia dispatched to occupy Crimea in 2014, all the while denying it had invaded.
A group of Azerbaijanis claiming to be environmental activists blocked the Lachin corridor.
The report shows that they are clearly 'representatives of Azerbaijani non-governmental organizations, which are directly and exclusively financed by the Azerbaijani government, or the Heydar Aliyev Foundation headed by the first vice president and first lady of Azerbaijan. Furthermore, evidence has been registered that representatives of the Azerbaijani special services are also amongst the alleged "environmental activists" who are currently blocking the only lifeline' for Nagorno-Karabakh.
The "activists" who have been keeping Karabakh under blockade for three consecutive days now have "interesting" identities, but not for any environmental protection activities. In fact, they represent organizations that have very clear connections with the Azerbaijani government and are financed, at least in part, by the state.
On December 14, Meydan TV employees Aytaj Tapdığ, Khayala Aghayeva and independent journalist Teymur Karimov were detained by civilians and black masked men while going to prepare a report from the Shusha-Khankendi road...The journalists say that before they were returned, their cameras were confiscated and their footage was deleted.
...we urge the Azerbaijani authorities to authorise an independent fact-finding visit and to allow independent journalists to operate freely in the whole area.
The following week saw a reconfiguration of road links and military positions in the Lachin Corridor, with Azerbaijani forces constructing a new military post, taking control of strategic heights, ignoring Russian calls to return to their original locations, and seizing land in Armenia around the new road leading from the villages of Tegh and Kornidzor towards Karabakh.
...on March 26, 2023, Azerbaijani troops crossed the line of contact to launch an operation to cut off a dirt road that was providing some relief from the blockade of the Lachin Corridor, in violation of the 2020 cease-fire statement
The Russian Defence Ministry said Azerbaijani troops had 'breached' the line of contact in violation of the 9 November ceasefire agreement, which brought an end to the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War. They said Azerbaijani forces had taken up new positions near Shusha.
Azerbaijani forces continued to occupy on Monday a strategic hill near the Lachin corridor seized by them at the weekend, further complicating Nagorno-Karabakh's communication with Armenia and the outside world...the high ground occupied by Azerbaijani soldiers overlooks the barely passable bypass road leading to the Armenian border.
Azerbaijani troops redeployed on Thursday morning to more parts of the Lachin district adjacent to the Armenian border, blocking the old [Lachin] corridor section.
The Azerbaijani 'eco-activists' blocking the Lachin Corridor near Shusha (Shushi) have suspended their action following the installation of an Azerbaijani border checkpoint on the corridor. According to identical articles published across Azerbaijani state and pro-government news websites on Friday afternoon, the eco-activists said they were 'very happy with the establishment of a border control mechanism', which they reportedly said would 'ensur[e] transparency, rule of law and safety of traffic on the road'.
The move [installation of a checkpoint] has increased the blockade of Nagorny Karabakh...A checkpoint on the border would give Azerbaijan the ability to stop any cars travelling between Armenia and Nagorny Karabakh.
Russian peacekeepers have been notified of the latest incident, and have stated they are presently in talks with Azerbaijan to withdraw from the area, and "stop engineering work" that Azerbaijan began after taking the position.
While they [the "eco-activists"] have since departed, a new corridor checkpoint guarded by Azeri soldiers continues to restrict the movement of people and goods.
Checkpoint on Lachin corridor faced fierce opposition amid humanitarian crisis....Azerbaijani military consolidated [the] blockade, however, leading to even fewer crossings and reduced transportation of goods.
Armenian civilians of Nagorno Karabakh and surrounding regions along the Armenian-Azerbaijani border are threatened by Azerbaijan's military and face violence if they try to leave Armenian territory within disputed areas.
While travellers were already few due to the blockade, the ICRC reports that its ability to get people across has been curtailed [since the installation of the checkpoint], leaving only the Russian peacekeepers to facilitate trips to Armenia for medical care.
Daily two-hour power cuts instituted on 9 January were replaced with four-hour daily power cuts on 17 January.
When Azerbaijan's blockade began, kindergartens and schools were among the first institutions to be shut down due to gas supply cuts and shortages, depriving students across dozens of schools of the right to education. Since then, the operations of nearly every educational institution in Nagorno-Karabakh, including NGOs with branches in Stepanakert and across the region, have been deeply disturbed by the blockade.
Education: The outcome of all this has led to the closure of all the schools. 30,000 kindergarten to 12th-grade students are being deprived of education. College students are unable to complete their year-end final exams, thus affecting their higher education plans and graduation.
[the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe]...is extremely worried by events...which culminated on 12 December 2022 with the interruption of the free and safe passage through the Lachin corridor and the subsequent deliberate cutting of electricity and gas supplies to the region... [The Assembly]...urges Azerbaijan to restore electricity and gas supplies without delay or impediment.
whereas this humanitarian crisis was further aggravated by Azerbaijan's disruption of the natural gas supply to Nagorno-Karabakh, which left houses, hospitals and schools without heating...[the European Parliament]...urges Azerbaijan to refrain from undermining the functioning of transport, energy and communication connections between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh in future.
The blockade and deliberate attacks on the critical infrastructure of Artsakh are a violation of Article 11.1, Right to Adequate Standard of Living and Article 12, The Right to Healthcare of International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
By cutting access to necessary utilities, more than 120,000 civilians (including children and the elderly), hospitals, schools, universities, and kindergartens have been, deliberately, deprived of gas, heating, and hot water.
Azerbaijan has repeatedly turned off the supply of natural gas and electricity to Artsakh, subjecting its people to freezing temperatures.
The latest gas cut to the region is ongoing, having begun around two months ago on 22 March.
There has been no gas supply to Karabakh since March 22.
The shortage of gas and petrol is further exacerbated by frequent cuts to the supply of gas from Azerbaijan and electricity cuts that last an average of six hours a day.
On May 3 group of NK residents set up tents on the road and announced an indefinite protest — "No to the ethnic cleansing of Artsakh". They demand the removal of the checkpoint.
France's foreign minister has joined international observers in warning of the risk of 'ethnic cleansing' in the breakaway region.
The number of victims of the 44-day war is 3825 by today's data.
{{cite news}}: CS1 maint: bot: original URL status unknown (link)
People reasonably argue that Russia is playing both sides...
Russia, perhaps the conflict's most important party, is neutral but very openly playing both sides.
The military alliance with Russia entitles Armenia to buying Russian weapons at discounted prices. Moscow lent the Armenian government $200 million for such arms acquisitions in 2015.
Russia, one of the largest arms exporters in the world, sells weapons to both sides in the conflict – though Armenia, as a member of the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization, gets a discount.
The latest clashes indirectly pit Turkey against Russia. Turkey backs Azerbaijan, while Russia supports Armenia.
Turkey [...] has served as the Caspian-Sea country's chief ally in Baku's nearly 30-year struggle with Armenia for control of the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave.
Turkey, which is Azerbaijan's chief ally...
On the Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, he said "Turkey is our main supporter on this issue".
Baku has bought arms from Turkey and imported Altay tanks, T129 ATAK helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and armed unmanned aerial vehicles (AUAV).
Ayatollah Khamenei reiterated Iran's long-held position that the Islamic Republic is ready to help resolve the conflict between Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan.
Khatami said Iran is ready to contribute to a peaceful solution of the conflict. He added that Iran considers Nagorno-Karabakh part of Azerbaijan and that the use of force in settling international problems is "unacceptable."
General Baqeri further said Iran decisively supports territorial integrity of Azerbaijan Republic.
...Vaezi said preserving the territorial integrity of other countries namely Azerbaijan has been Iran's regional strategy.
Reaffirming Iran's support to Azerbaijan Republic's territorial integrity, outgoing ambassador said that concerns of Azerbaijan Republic are also concerns of Iran.
...Iran provided vital backing to Armenia in its war against Azerbaijan...
...Iran's support of Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict...
...Iran's support of Armenia, Azerbaijan's western neighbor and sworn enemy, in the long-running war over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh."
However, Russia was not the only ally of Armenia, but also Greece and Iran, both with a long history of tense relations with Turkey. Greece supported Armenia both by delivering military and economic assistance and diplomatic representation by promoting Armenia's interests in the EU and NATO. Iran provided trade opportunities and an opening to the maritime space.
Iran supports Armenia [...] To be sure, the assistance provided to Armenia and Azerbaijan respectively by these neighboring states has been limited to diplomatic support and occasional economic favors.
Washington has two foreign policies toward the region, one pro-Azeri, the other anti-Azeri. The pro-Azeri policy belongs to the administration, which listens to the oil companies. The anti-Azeri policy belongs to Congress, which listens to the Armenian lobby.
In 1999, China made its first arms sale in the Caucasus by supplying WM-80 rocket launchers to Armenia.
Meanwhile, Ukraine reports that it has engaged in the time-honored tradition of selling weapons to both sides of a conflict.
...ՊՆ աղբյուրների, ինչպես նաև այլ հետազոտությունների արդյունքում հայտնի է դարձել, որ համակարգերը Հայաստանը միջնորդ ընկերության միջոցով ձեռք է բերել Հորդանանից:
Israel supported the Azeri side in this conflict by supplying Stinger missiles to Azerbaijani troops during the war.
...these weapons are destined to be used not against Iran, but against Armenia...
Azerbaijan has purchased nearly $5 billion-worth of defense equipment from Israel...
But as subsequent events evolved it became all too apparent that Ukraine has steadfastly stood behind Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict all along. ...it was reported from Stepanakert that Ukraine had shipped 40 tanks to Azerbaijan. Later that number was raised to 59. Ukraine had also supplied Azerbaijan with Mig-21 attack planes....
Weapons that Jaroslav Strnad and Excalibur sold to Israeli firm Elbit had immediately arrived in Azerbaijan...
Alpaslan Turkesh, founder of the Turkish fascist Grey Wolves, acknowledged that his followers were fighting in Karabagh with Azerbaijani forces, though it was reported in late 1992 that they had returned to Turkey.
{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
Some say he joined the Chechen guerrillas fighting on Azerbaijan's side during the 1992–93 Nagorno-Karabakh war, though Ashurov and the Ministry of Defense's spokesman dismiss this idea.
It is also revealed that a new force of 200 armed members of the Grey Wolves organization has been dispatched from Turkey in preparation for a new Azeri offensive and to train units of the Azeri army.
В самый разгар Карабахской войны в 1992 году на помощь Карабаху пришли казаки из Кубани, 85 человек. 14 из них погибли, защищая Арцах.
36 героев – осетин, навсегда вписали свои имена в одну из ярчайших страниц армянской истории – Арцахскую освободительную войну. В целом, в осетинском батальоне насчитывалось 30 осетин (26 христиан и 4 мусульман), один кабардиниец, татарин, русский и три армянина.
В борьбе за свободу и независимость на помощь народу Арцаха пришли и волонтеры из Южной Осетии.
Наибольшей известностью в Арцахе пользовался Мирза Абаев. В 1992 году он прибыл добровольцем в Нагорный Карабах из России.
The contribution of the volunteer-fighters from Diaspora into the military victory of the Artsakh struggle is invaluable.
Many members of ASALA fought against Azerbaijan during the war over Karabakh as part of the Armenian and Nagorno-Karabakh militaries.PDF, archived
...the three South Caucasian de facto states have mutually recognized each other, as well as being recognized by (unrecognized) Transnistria.
Vyacheslav Chirikba asked to convey his condolences to the families of those killed in hostilities and voiced the support of the people and authorities of Abkhazia to Artsakh.
The Minister assured his colleague that South Ossetia people follow the development of situation and offered words of support to people of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic.
The head of the Pridnestrovian diplomacy expressed compassion and support to the people of Artsakh in connection with the escalation of tension on the part of the Republic of Azerbaijan.
Greece, on the other hand, had no particular reasons to shun Azerbaijan, but its historical friendship with the Armenian people, and shared concerns over Turkish aggression, naturally induced a pro-Armenian Greek policy.
The Government of the Republic of Cyprus monitors closely the worrying developments in Nagorno-Karabakh/Artsakh, following the violations of the armistice line from Azerbaijani military forces.
Minister Christodoulides expressed to Minister Mnatsakanyan his concern about this development, condemned the ceasefire violation by Azerbaijan...
...we are deeply concerned that [...] that Karabagh, an indivisible part of Azerbaijan, continues to be occupied by Armenia.
В этой связи позиция Республики Узбекистан по решению проблемы Нагорного Карабаха остается твердой и неизменной. Узбекистан открыто ее подтверждал при голосовании инициированных Азербайджаном соответствующих резолюций Генеральной Ассамблеи ООН в 2008 году. Узбекистан последовательно выступал и продолжает выступать за мирное, политическое решение нагорно-карабахского конфликта и при этом главным условием урегулирования считает обеспечение территориальной целостности и суверенитета Азербайджана.
While describing Uzbekistan's position on the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, Islam Karimov said: [...] Uzbekistan considers the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan as one of the key preconditions for its settlement. I believe that this position is absolutely consistent with international standards, meets historical parallels. Uzbekistan's position on this issue remains unchanged: the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan is a sacred concept, and it must be followed in all solution options of this problem.
In this matter, the Saudis have backed the right of Azerbaijan in the United Nations General Assembly meetings and in the OIC, asserting its internationally recognized authority over Nagorno-Karabakh. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia does not have yet any level of official or even unofficial ties with Armenia. This is because the Saudis have tended to side with Azerbaijan, especially on this particular issue.
The Kingdom fully and resolutely supports Azerbaijan's position on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the territorial integrity of your country.
...Speaker of the Saudi Arabia's Shura Council Abdullah Bin Mohammed Bin Ibrahim Al-Sheikh told journalists here. He underlined Saudi Arabia supports all international organizations' decisions and resolutions supporting resolution of the conflict based on territorial integrity of Azerbaijan.
Ali Hasan Jafarin, Saudi Arabia's ambassadors to Baku, said in an interview with the independent newspaper "525" that his country unanimously supports the Azerbaijani position on Nagorno-Karabakh in all international organizations and forums.
Ukraine's current and former governments have repeatedly voiced support for Azerbaijan in the Karabakh conflict.
Ukraine expressed support for Azerbaijan, stating the need to maintain territorial integrity, which aroused the indignation of the Armenian authorities.
First of all, it is about the war in eastern Ukraine and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. We invariably support one another in restoring sovereignty and territorial integrity of our states within internationally recognized borders.
The Ukrainian side advocates a political settlement of the situation based on respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Azerbaijan within its internationally recognized borders.
Because of its proximity to the Karabakh conflict zone, Georgia is vitally concerned with the settlement of the conflict. It is officially Azerbaijan's strategic partner, upholds the preservation of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity and supports the latter in its conflict with Armenia on most contentious issues. [...] ...Georgia's obviously pro-Azerbaijan approach to the Karabakh problem...
Georgia firmly upholds the principle of territorial integrity, which is contrary to the position of Nagorny Karabakh and Armenia.
Due to its vital national interest, Georgia cannot support a self-determination policy. This is actually an important factor why on the international stage, Tbilisi officially calls for the respect of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity.
The declarations of support for each other's territorial integrity, have become a lasting tradition in Georgian-Azerbaijani diplomatic encounters, which is hardly any surprise from two countries that have similar territorial issues. While Georgia has supported Azerbaijan in the past, it opted not to this time.
Georgia supports territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Azerbaijan within its internationally recognized borders and supports the peaceful settlement of conflict based on the principles and norms of international law.
Serbia backs Azerbaijan's stance on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and enjoys its support on Kosovo.
Serbia's position toward Azerbaijan's breakaway region of Karabakh [...] is that of unconditional support for Azerbaijan' territorial integrity.
Kazakhstan's de facto pro-Azerbaijani policy had previously been a source of serious concern in Armenia.PDF (archived)
...the Central Asian state's pro-Azerbaijani position on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
Belarus has consistently supported peaceful reintegration of Karabakh with Azerbaijan. [...] Minsk's pro-Azerbaijani position therefore is natural.
The Joint Statement explicitly states that this conflict must be resolved in accordance with the norms of international law, within the framework of territorial integrity and the inviolability of the borders of Azerbaijan and in accordance with relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council.
"Palestine supports Azerbaijan for 100% in this issue. We believe the conflict should be resolved in peaceful way through negotiations", N.A. Kareem added.
"We have always declared that territories under Armenian occupation belong to Azerbaijan", al-Malki underscored. The foreign minister said Palestine wants peaceful resolution of the conflict and liberation of occupied lands of Azerbaijan. "We call on the international community to exert pressure on Armenia in order to achieve peace", Al-Malki stressed.
...Israel from the start took on an overtly pro-Azerbaijani stance in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
Israel has repeatedly declared that Tel Aviv supports Azerbaijan's territorial integrity.
The U.S., Russia, and France had opposed a similar resolution which Baku managed to push through the UN assembly in March 2008. It was backed by 39 countries, most of them Islamic.
As a result, on March 14, 2008, it was mainly the Muslim nations that supported Azerbaijan's resolution on the Karabakh conflict at the UN General Assembly.
Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev had lambasted the Minsk Group co-chairs (Russia, France and the United States) in an unusually explicit manner for what he described as their ineffectiveness and alleged pro-Armenian bias (President.az, July 6).
....Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Vilayat Guliev publicly accused the body of pro-Armenian bias.
As a result, three of the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council are more or less biased towards Armenia in the conflict (including France, where a substantial Armenian minority exists, which has always been politically active.)
As a result of the 2020 war, however, Azerbaijan received all territories around Soviet-era Nagorno Karabakh that were occupied by Armenian forces during the first Karabakh war, plus the two regions of Nagorno Karabakh proper: Shushi/Shusha and Hadrut.
The Armenian side also lost territories within the former NKAO, namely the district of Hadrut and the strategic town of Shusha/Shushi, areas that were not even considered for handover to Azerbaijan during the long years of diplomatic negotiations between the two wars.
The new agreement allows Azerbaijan to keep the territory it took by force, including Shusha and Hadrut, within the historic boundaries of Nagorno-Karabakh. It also requires Armenian forces to turn over other territories they have occupied for the last 26 years, including the so-called Lachin corridor, which is Nagorno-Karabakh's primary link to Armenia proper.
{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: DOI inactive as of December 2024 (link)
{{citation}}: CS1 maint: DOI inactive as of November 2024 (link)
On 24th November 2020 the Martakert-Karvachar-Vardenis highway was closed; thus, the only operational route between NK and Armenia now is via the Lachin corridor.
In an ironic twist, the unarmed European observers in Armenia and the armed Russian peacekeepers have begun to look alike, both preventing full-scale warfare but unable to fully contain Baku's ambitions. The 'Russian peacekeepers,' political scientist Nerses Kopalyan commented sharply, 'function more like an impotent observation mission than an armed contingent.'
Whereas Russia's alleged readiness to guarantee the security of Armenia has proven to be non-existent, as demonstrated by its lack of response to Azerbaijan's continuous attacks even in the light of Armenia's attempt to resort to the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO); [The European Parliament] Recalls that the clauses of the CSTO were not activated either during the 2020 war or in September 2022, despite Armenian requests; encourages Armenia, in order to ensure better protection of its sovereignty and territorial integrity, to consider the possibility of diversifying its partnerships and potential security alliances with its regional and Euro-Atlantic partners, as its long-standing reliance on Russia and its allies in the CSTO has proved insufficient.
The Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh is one of four frozen conflicts that emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Legally recognized as a part of Azerbaijan, it declared independence in 1991 and then defended that independence in a war with Azerbaijan that lasted until 1994. While it enjoys no international recognition of sovereignty, Nagorno-Karabakh has been de facto independent since its declaration and has been supported militarily and economically by neighboring Armenia.
At the end of 1991 the parties were in stark confrontation after Azerbaijan abolished Nagorno-Karabakh's autonomous status and the latter declared independence after the plebiscite-referendum of 10 December 1991.
For nearly 30 years, they built a self-proclaimed independent republic with democratic elections, a free press, and a range of public institutions. Officially, it remained within the territorial boundaries of Azerbaijan, unrecognized by any foreign country, though international mediators made reference to the right of self-determination for local Armenians as part of ongoing peace talks.
The Lemkin Institute believes that, given the circumstances, the self-determination of the people of Artsakh is a form of genocide prevention in addition to a right recognized by the Charter of the United Nations and several human rights treaties and declarations, which has become part of international jus cogens. Self-determination is further a recognized right of all peoples under oppressive colonial regimes.
President Aliyev told Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians to 'obey the laws of Azerbaijan [and] be a loyal and normal citizen of Azerbaijan'. He threatened that if the territory's separatist institutions were not dissolved, Azerbaijan would dissolve them by force and rejected the prospect of international protections for ethnic Armenians.
The president of Azerbaijan has delivered an ultimatum to de facto authorities in Nagorno Karabakh: disband your government or prepare for the consequences. He suggested Baku could easily end Armenian administration of the region through military action.
The history of violence against Armenians in Azerbaijan, including the recent execution of Armenian prisoners of war and the sexual mutilation of female soldiers, give Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh little confidence in their safety...According to Freedom House, Azerbaijan's government "has worked to stifle public expressions of Talysh and Lezgin identity, among other targeted groups."
Azerbaijan says the territory's inhabitants can live as Azerbaijani citizens under its sovereignty, but Armenians treat these claims with derision. 'Azerbaijani dissidents say even Azerbaijanis do not enjoy their constitutional rights,' Tigran Grigoryan, head of the Regional Centre for Democracy and Security, an Armenian think tank, told me. 'So how can Armenians expect to?'
France's foreign minister has joined international observers in warning of the risk of 'ethnic cleansing' in the breakaway region.
Khachatryan's detention confirms the fears of many Karabakh Armenians that, if Azerbaijan assumes control over Karabakh, it will detain (and torture) them arbitrarily, using their participation in one or more of the wars as justification. This criteria extends to nearly every male resident of the small enclave. "Arrests with linkages to the past wars, local army or the [Karabakh] government …would quality almost all local men for detentions," wrote Olesya Vartanyan, International Crisis Group's senior analyst for the South Caucasus. The detainees can expect torture or worse, as the Armenian prisoners of war following the 2020 war conflict experienced.
Khachatryan's detention confirms the fears of many Karabakh Armenians that, if Azerbaijan assumes control over Karabakh, it will detain (and torture) them arbitrarily, using their participation in one or more of the wars as justification. This criteria extends to nearly every male resident of the small enclave. "Arrests with linkages to the past wars, local army or the [Karabakh] government …would quality almost all local men for detentions," wrote Olesya Vartanyan, International Crisis Group's senior analyst for the South Caucasus. The detainees can expect torture or worse, as the Armenian prisoners of war following the 2020 war conflict experienced.
