Convoy MW 3 was made up of three empty merchantmen from Malta with an Australian destroyer and the monitorHMS Terror bound for the base at Suda Bay in Crete thence to Alexandria. The convoy was escorted by the anti-aircraft cruiserHMS Coventry, accompanied by three destroyers. The 11.5 kn (13.2 mph; 21.3 km/h) convoy left Alexandria on 4 November and reached Malta on 10 November.
Convoy ME 3
Convoy ME 3 comprised four merchantmen sailing in ballast from Malta to Alexandria, under escort of the battleship HMS Ramillies, Coventry, and two destroyers. The convoy sailed from Malta on 10 November and arrived in Alexandria on 13 November.
Convoy AN 6
Convoy AN 6 consisted of four slow tankers bound for Greece from Egypt, in support of the British expedition there, escorted by a slow trawler. Shaping a similar course were reinforcements for Crete, embarked in the light cruisers HMS Ajax and HMAS Sydney as Force B, while Force C, the light cruiser HMS Orion (Vice Admiral Henry Pridham-Wippell) transported RAF supplies to Greece and inspected Suda Bay. All three would rejoin to form Force X for an 11/12 November raid on the Otranto Strait.
Operation Crack
Operation Crack was an attack on Cagliari by aircraft from Ark Royal, en route to Malta, branching off from Operation Coat.
Operation Judgement, under the command of Admiral Andrew Cunningham, was executed by aircraft from the carrier HMS Illustrious, escorted by the battleships Ramillies, Warspite, Valiant and Malaya. They met the heavy cruiser York, the light cruiser Gloucester and three destroyers, then escorting Convoy MW 3 and provided cover. A rendezvous with the Barham group from Operation Coat was to be made, with Illustrious, Gloucester, York and Berwick detaching to attack Taranto, coincident with the Force X raid. The Italians were aware of sorties from Alexandria and Gibraltar by 7 November and sent nine submarines to attack a Malta convoy (MW 3) detected on 8 November. Bombers (unsurprisingly) failed even to pinpoint the Judgement force and when Force H was detected heading back toward Gibraltar on 9 November, the Italians assumed that MW 3 had turned around, too.
Italian confusion arose when Barham, Berwick, Glasgow and their destroyers were detected 10 November off Lemnos. The correct deduction, that they had detached from the Gibraltar-bound force, was not accompanied by a correct guess they would join with Cunningham. The same day, Ramillies, Coventry and two destroyers protecting ME 3 were detected and again, bombers failed to locate them. The complexity of Operation MB8, with its forces and convoys, deceived the Italians into thinking that only normal convoying was underway. While Italian reconnaissance was characteristically bad, in the end, the Italians had only failed to keep track of Illustrious. That the Italians expected the British to behave in what was, at the time, their usual way was the cause of the mistake.
Hague, Arnold (2000). The Allied Convoy System 1939–1945. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press. ISBN1-55750-019-3.
Greene, Jack; Massignani, Alessandro (1998). The Naval War in the Mediterranean 1940–1943. London: Chatham. ISBN1-885119-61-5.
Stephen, Martin (1988). Grove, Eric (ed.). Sea Battles in Close-up: World War 2. Vol. I. Shepperton, Surrey: Ian Allan. ISBN0-7110-1596-1.
Further reading
Bragadin, M. (1957) [1948]. Fioravanzo, G. (ed.). The Italian Navy in World War II. Translated by Hoffman, G. (Eng. trans. ed.). Annapolis, Maryland: United States Naval Institute. OCLC602717421.
Dannreuther, Raymond (2005). Somerville's Force H: The Royal Navy's Gibraltar-based Fleet, June 1940 to March 1942. London: Aurum Press. ISBN1-84513-020-0.
Hague, Arnold (2000). The Allied Convoy System 1939–1945. London: Chatham. ISBN1-86176-147-3.
O'Hara, Vincent P. (2009). Struggle for the Middle Sea: The Great Navies at War in the Mediterranean Theater, 1940–1945. London: Conway. ISBN978-1-84486-102-6.
Rohwer, Jürgen; Hümmelchen, Gerhard (2005). Chronology of the War at Sea 1939–1945: The Naval History of World War Two (3rd rev. ed.). Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press. ISBN1-59114-119-2.